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**BEAR AND
DRAGON**



What Is the Relation Between Moscow and Peking?


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BEAR AND DRAGON

What Is the Relation Between Moscow and Peking?

CONTENTS

Introduction: Operation Will-o'-the-Wisp	James Burnham	5
Perspective I: World History	Wlodzimierz Baczkowski	9
Perspective II: Russian History	Donald W. Treadgold	14
Perspective III: Chinese History	David Nelson Rowe	19
Perspective IV: Communist History	Branko Lazitch	23
Perspective V: Strategy	Stefan T. Possony	28
Perspective VI: Demography	Karl A. Wittfogel	33
Perspective VII: Semantics	Libra	37
Perspective VIII: Disinformation	Natalie Grant	41

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MEMORANDUM

To: Publisher, National Review
From: Charles Edison

The American-Asian Educational Exchange was organized in 1957 for ". . . the exchange of information, literature and personnel for the purposes of creating a broader understanding between the peoples of the United States and the independent nations of Asia insofar as they refer to our common struggle for freedom against totalitarian oppression."

The Exchange has been fortunate in enlisting the active cooperation of distinguished and dedicated individuals in both the United States and Asia. In spite of restricted financial resources, we have managed to draw Asians and Americans together in a common front, and to make real, if still modest, progress in the line of our basic aims.

There are other distinguished organizations in the United States and Asia that work together toward mutual understanding. For the most part, their programs are limited to philanthropy and purely cultural exchanges. Even the agencies of our government do not seem to be meeting the political challenge of the increasingly critical advance of international communism. The American-Asian Educational Exchange is one of the very few organizations that explicitly recognizes, and seeks to fulfill, the political along with the cultural requirements.

As part of our program, we are pleased to cooperate with National Review in preparation of this symposium on the problem of Sino-Soviet relations. We believe that its wide distribution in the United States and, through translation, in Asia will add to our knowledge of the plans and purposes of international communism, and thereby help to strengthen our hands in dealing with it.

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Introduction

Operation Will-o'-the-Wisp

Communism has roots that extend backward, through the first two Internationals and the Marx-Engels Manifesto of 1848, to the primitive Christian Church, classical Greece, and Palestine's age of the prophets. As an operational enterprise, however, communism went on line in 1903, when Lenin pieced together his Bolshevik faction at the convention of the Russian Social Democratic Party that adjourned to London after having run into trouble with the police in Brussels. The enterprise started with a couple of dozen adherents; a few hundred pounds, borrowed from the first bourgeois fellow-traveler, as treasury; and six or eight revolvers as arsenal. It had, in addition, a goal and a strategy.

The goal was a monopoly of power over the whole world: a World Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics in which, as the chosen anthem proclaimed, "the international party will be the human race." The strategy was to struggle by all and every means until the goal was achieved, until the communists themselves should be alone on earth—and non-communists, by necessary implication, buried. This goal and this strategy were adopted once for all, as the defining essence of the enterprise. Both were explicitly and publicly stated.

Today, fifty-seven years later, the communist enterprise, in pursuit of its fixed goal through its total strategy, has consolidated as its base the most powerful strategic situation on earth; extended its rule over a billion human beings and a fifth of the world's land surface; neutralized half and infiltrated all of the remainder; amassed resources and arms able to challenge if not yet equal those of the surviving opposition. In 1917-23 the enterprise took over the greater part of the Russian Empire. In the early 1930's it added Outer Mongolia. In 1944-49 it got eastern Europe and drove through to the China Sea and the Himalayas. In the

early 1950's it moved into the Korean and Southeast Asian peninsulas, and acquired a foothold on the South Sea islands. In 1956 it entered the Middle East. During the past year it has planted beachheads in Africa and Latin America. Advance units of the enterprise are in continuing behind-the-lines action within all nations where it does not yet prevail.

Words to Get Lost By

At every stage in this world-advance, which has no precedent in history for either scale or speed, non-communist opinion has wandered after beckoning formulas that have whispered that the communists did not, or could not, mean what they had said: that they didn't really seek to conquer *all* the earth; that they were not really prepared to use *every* means.

In the earliest years it was easy enough. Not many then, outside the ranks, had even heard of communism (Bolshevism). There was no need to take seriously what you didn't know existed. A few prescient eyes saw something of the future in the course of Russia's 1905 revolt. But Lenin's enterprise was still very small in 1905, and did not appear under its own banner in that action. The communists were intermingled with liberals, socialists, populists and miscellaneous radicals. The most spectacular individual leader of 1905, the young Trotsky, did not at that time adhere to the enterprise or its discipline.

As the enterprise gathered itself together in the years after 1905, it seemed, to most of those who became acquainted with it, a mere minor sect—the radical, rather crackpot wing of the great social democratic movement, within the framework of which the communists were still functioning. When the war came, the communists—who broke away from the social democratic parties after

the reformist majority rallied to defense of the "bourgeois fatherland"—seemed a powerless, doctrinaire, anti-war handful scattered in jails, Siberia, Switzerland and the Bronx.

The 1917 Revolution brought little clarification. For the Germans, at first, the destiny of Bolshevism was only to speed the collapse of the Czar's armies by defeatist propaganda; and on that assumption the General Staff sped Lenin and his associates from Switzerland eastward in the meticulously sealed train. The Allied powers were ready to accept the communists as one segment of the patriotic Russian people who were replacing medieval autocracy by a modern parliamentary regime that would be much better suited to the task of making the world safe for democracy. The Western liberals and socialists felt no need to omit the communists from their greetings to the forces of progress that were leading Russia onward and upward into the modern age.

Lenin as Teacher

When Lenin's enterprise revealed that it meant business about quitting the war, when it outlawed rival parties even of the farthest Left, and sent its Red Armies to destroy non-communist regimes within the former Czarist realm and to attack the border regions, a few persons in the Allied coalition took alarm. They fought back in Poland, Hungary and the Baltic states, and made a half-hearted intervention in support of the enterprise's doomed internal rivals. By 1923 the storms subsided. The enterprise abandoned its premature lunges against the West. It fell back inside the reduced Czarist boundaries to consolidate its victories and gather strength for rounds to come. The primary external drive, having been temporarily stopped in its direct push westward, shifted to a vast encircling movement through

Asia, supplemented by infiltration operations in the Western countries.

New formulas arose to beckon Western opinion away from the truth that it did not choose to face. Fixing its attention on the now stabilized western border, and thus overlooking the flanking campaign already launched in China, Western opinion now found it easy to believe that the communist enterprise, however distasteful by Western standards, had quieted down (*viz.*, the New Economic Policy) and was no longer a danger. In spite of the ritual internationalist jargon of the leaders, the Revolution was "fundamentally Russian" and "not for export." Besides, the new Soviet government had all it could do at home, trying to rebuild the food supply and the shattered economy. This comforting formula seemed to be confirmed when Stalin won his domestic victory under the slogan of "Socialism in One Country." No one could object—could they?—to a nation's having whatever internal system it wanted. The Soviet regime, if still backward, was now sufficiently regularized in the eyes of the West to permit trade and diplomatic recognition.

Too Popular Front

After 1933 the still more seductive will-o'-the-wisp of the Popular Front was added to the lights flickering on the horizon. The Soviet Union and the communist enterprise were bulwarks against the gravest threat and greatest evil, fascism-Nazism. Even if from motives somewhat different from ours, the communists were opposed to Nazism. Far from being any longer a menace to the free world, the communist enterprise was to become its indispensable colleague. A lingering minority dissent to this formula sounded briefly louder during the two puzzling years of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, but instantly evaporated in 1941, when the communists became — so read the rejuvenated formula of those days—our staunch allies in the democratic war against totalitarianism, Hitler, and (for a couple of weeks) the Mikado.

The war-time ally formula wore itself out rather quickly after the shooting stopped, but Tito popped up just in time to keep Western eyes from focusing. Confrontation of the

truth about the goal and strategy of the communist enterprise, and about the consequent counter-strategy required of the non-communist world, could be conscientiously avoided, this time, because an internally divisive and thus outwardly harmless national communism, modelling itself on Tito, was going to replace the monolithic communist structure.

With the death of Stalin, a whole new covey of formulas rose on the wind. We now learned that the trouble had, all along, been the individual Stalin, a tyrant, megalomaniac, sadist and general psychopath. With Stalin out of the way, a sensible "committee government" was taking over, thus introducing some of the checks and balances of democracy. It was being influenced by Malenkov to give up dreams of world conquest in order to please consumers; by Beria, to close Stalin's slave camps; by Zhukov, to revert from cosmopolitanism to Russian nationalism; by the intellectuals, to abandon totalitarian controls.

When Khrushchev took it upon himself to kill Beria, purge Malenkov, demote Zhukov and bring the intellectuals to heel, he evidently absorbed by a kind of spiritual osmosis the ideas of his victims. Now it was



Khrushchev's ascendancy that showed that we could hope to coexist with the enterprise, that there was no need to defeat it. Our scholars proved that Khrushchev had to favor disarmament, peace, coexistence and

internal liberalization, because the people demanded more consumer goods, youth insisted on a more open society, the industrial managers wanted a freer hand in running industry, and everybody was sick of Stalinism. Khrushchev's crushing of the Hungarian revolt was a parenthetical throwback that did not affect "the basic trends."

Throughout the world an eager welcome mat was spread for Khrushchev, the liberalizer and coexister. This formula not only retained but steadily fortified its attractive power,

until the aborted Summit Conference of May, 1960; nor was it even thereafter dead, but sleeping.

Before, however, bringing to a close this summary list of the diversionary formulas, we must turn back in order to add a short converging series. Not long after its victory in Russia, the enterprise began, as we have noted, a major operation in Asia, specifically in China. Although this had attained a rather formidable scale as early as 1926-27, Western opinion was not much concerned with communism in China until the mid-1930's, when for the first time stories about the Chinese "Red Army," the "Long March," the "Yenan government," and Mao Tse-tung began to appear in both public journals and the private dispatches of foreign service officers.

Yenan Way and Ways

Attached to these stories, and to the analyses, interpretations, monographs and theses of and on the Chinese Revolution that soon proliferated, there was, as always in the West's relation to any phase of the communist enterprise, an attractive formula adapted to the job of leading the mind away from the truth about communism's goal and strategy. In this case, since China was particularly in question, the formula was of course cooked *à la mode de la Chine*.

The terms of the Chinese formula became well enough known not only in the days when it flourished but from discussion, inquiry and debate after it was laid uneasily to rest. Reduced to simplest terms, it read: a) Chinese communism is not an offshoot, auxiliary or dependency of Russian communism or the Soviet-dominated Comintern; b) Chinese communism is an authentic, nationalist, Chinese development; c) considered as a social tendency, Chinese communism is not in fact "communist" in the Russian communist sense, but rather a radical, peasant (agrarian, populist) movement. Corollaries to the formula explained that Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang represented not Chinese nationalism but reactionary "feudalism."

This formula, in varied guises, prevailed until some time after the completion of the Communist conquest of mainland China in 1949. It had a per-

vasive influence, negatively and positively, on American and Western policy toward China during the war and postwar years. After the Korean War began, however—with Western soldiers being killed by communist Chinese troops shooting Russian guns, flying Russian planes, and trained very often by Russian instructors—this formula was largely withdrawn from public circulation. But its attractive power has continued to express itself in campaigns for diplomatic recognition of, UN membership for, and increased trade with, Communist China, and for liquidation of Chiang's regime on Formosa.

More recently the still hardy roots of this perennial have been grafted onto a new plant that has been pushing up for the past few years until it was ready to burst into bloom in the Summit harvest. Since May, 1960, the dominant formula—the ascendant will-o'-the-wisp drawing Western eyes toward its flickering outline—has been "the Sino-Soviet conflict." The initial impotence of the communists, their Russian patriotism, Stalin's abandonment of the international revolution, communist anti-fascism, the alliance against Hitler, Chinese agrarian democracy, Tito and national communism, committee government, patriotic opposition of the military, the thaw, consumer desires, Khrushchev the liberalizer and coexist—*all*, one after another, have failed and betrayed us. But the Sino-Soviet conflict remains, and we shall yet be saved.

It may be observed that "the Sino-Soviet conflict" is a synthetic formula—a "dialectical synthesis at a higher level," the communists themselves would say. It compresses into one package the essential juice of both the eastern and western series. In it we can discover derivatives of the early formulas about Khrushchev's softening of Russian communism (which, in turn, hark back to formulas about Stalin's domestication of Lenin-Trotsky's world revolution), as well as the earlier formula about the independent local roots and special character of Chinese communism. In effect, "the Sino-Soviet conflict" formula reassures us that neither Russian nor Chinese communism is really "communism," or really means what it says about destroying



"imperialism" and winning a victory "in the entire world." Rather, "the Sino-Soviet conflict" suggests, Russian and Chinese *soi-disant* communisms, reverting to ethnic and national origins, are developing into each other's worst enemy. They are gradually channelling their principal energies into internecine struggle. Such, at any rate, are the implications of Western analysis, 1960 model.

After tryouts in secluded scholarly circles, "the Sino-Soviet conflict" began to make public appearances in the West shortly after the conclusion of the Korean War. Incidentally, it seems to be a subject of conversation much favored by communist hosts, and has been frequently featured in the reports of statesmen and journalists on return from visits to Peking or Moscow. Mr. Lazitch, in his essay here printed, cites the statement of Clement Attlee on arriving back from China in 1954. Konrad Adenauer—who had perhaps been primed by the studies of Dr. Starlinger, to which Professor Wittfogel makes reference—is reliably reported to have been swung toward the formula during his visit to Moscow. Chancellor Adenauer, in turn, is said to have discussed it with General de Gaulle when they spent a weekend together at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises last winter. Shortly thereafter, in a public address motivating his invitation to Khrushchev to visit France, de Gaulle remarked a "more reasonable" Soviet attitude, which he attributed to the spreading "rift" between Russia and China, and the looming "threat" to the "white men" of Russia from the "yellow hordes" of Asia. The British had sighted the formula some while back, when they recognized the Peking regime and offered trade concessions. Adlai Stevenson, William Randolph Hearst, Jr., Senator Hubert Humphrey and Vice President Nixon were among the American travelers who brought versions of the "Sino-Soviet conflict" back among their Moscow gifts.

But it was the May, 1960, Summit blowup and the resultant damage to the "Khrushchev the liberalizer and coexist" formula that launched "the Sino-Soviet conflict" into stardom. Everybody—well, just about everybody—saw at once that Sino-Soviet conflict was the basic explanation for the way Khrushchev behaved in Paris. This was what the 3,000 correspondents cabled from the scene. "Pressure from the Chinese communists" was the gist of the judgment rendered, after due inquiry into the causes of the Summit episode, by Senator Fulbright and the Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Nixon soberly concurred, and Senator Humphrey, drawing on his eight and a half hours of Kremlin instruction, devoted a Senate speech in August to "the deep-seated frictions [that] have developed in the last few years" between China and the Soviet Union. "It is a fair assumption," he ventured, "that these cleavages will increase rather than lessen."

Passkey or New Look?

Newspaper editorial writers throughout Europe and the Americas composed creative variations on the formula's theme. Everybody quoted sentences plucked from journals in Moscow or Peking, and each other. Learned confirmation was not lacking, especially from those scholars who had been most conspicuous in developing the earlier Chinese formula about the non-Russian, local, agrarian roots of the Chinese communist movement. By September and the meeting of the UN General Assembly, "the Sino-Soviet conflict" had become all but universally accepted as a kind of general field theory for the explanation of all international goings-on.

Mr. C. L. Sulzberger of the *New York Times* found Khrushchev's UN behavior axiomatically explicable by his need "to affirm his pre-eminence within the communist bloc, now riven by the dispute with China." Mr. Joseph Alsop, who functions as a rhetorical triborough bridge linking journalism, the State Department and the academies, was able to sum up *ex cathedra* on September 16, 1960: "A threatened break between the Soviet Union and Communist China looks more and more like the missing

piece in the deeply disturbing puzzle of recent Soviet behavior. . . . Even the smallest possibility of a break could be counted on to exert great pressure on Khrushchev. But the evidence suggests that the possibility is not small. It is no slim chance now, but a rather strong possibility. If [a mid-October meeting between Khrushchev and Mao] fails [to compose the conflict], however, the betting will be rather better than even on an open Sino-Soviet break at the meeting of communist leaders over all the world that is expected to be held in Moscow in November."

From Formula to Reality

In its operational consequences, each of these formulas acts to divert non-communists, and the non-communist nations, from a line of action aiming at the defeat of the communist enterprise. This is the effect, whether or not any of the formulas or all of them successively are true, and whether their source is deliberate deception by the communists, wishful thinking by non-communists, or a fusion of both. Each formula suggests, either a) that the communists do not really mean what they say about conquering the world ("burying" us) and using all necessary means thereto; or b) that they will be prevented from achieving their goal by an internal development—bourgeoisification, internecine squabbles, liberalization, or whatever. On the

first alternative, peaceful, if competitive, coexistence is both possible and reasonable. On the second, we need only hold on a while. Stalin and Trotsky, or Tito and Stalin, or Beria and Khrushchev, or Khrushchev and Mao, or X and Y, will kill each other off, or a taste for free speech and consumer luxuries will dampen revolutionary ardor.

Most of the past diversionary formulas are no longer relevant or persuasive. Stalin's Socialism in One Country wasn't much of a comfort after Stalin grabbed eastern Europe. Most of us, even the experts on matters communist and Soviet, would probably admit, if pressed in private, that most or all of the earlier formulas were, well, mistaken. Still, we seldom admit this in public. The mistake is never subjected to a rigorous examination that might disclose the springs of error, and guard against their further influence. The old formula is merely shoved quietly out of public sight, while first the experts and then the rest of us switch smoothly to the new one — which never fails to make a timely appearance.

Even though the old formulas may have been mistaken and false, the new one, of course, may nevertheless be true. And there is no question but that most persons who express opinions on these matters do at present believe the now dominant formula of "the Sino-Soviet conflict" to be true. It is official, established, part of what

may properly be called "public opinion." Yet the fact that it is so generally believed does not, unfortunately, guarantee that it is any less mistaken than some at least of the past formulas have undoubtedly been. "The Sino-Soviet conflict" may be only the latest in the fifty-seven-year series of strategic will-o'-the-wisps that have beckoned the West away from the main road.

A paragraph from the letter of invitation that I wrote to the contributors whose essays follow hereon states the aim of this present project: "The American-Asian Educational Exchange has asked *National Review* to prepare and publish on its behalf a symposium on the critical problem of the relation between the Soviet Union and Communist China. . . . I am inviting eight experts to contribute essays that will analyze this central problem from the perspective of their respective special fields: Chinese history; Russian history; economics; communist operations and history; strategy, etc. The purpose of the symposium is not to debate issues of current practical policy, but to assemble and focus a body of relevant data, analysis and interpretation which will be of intrinsic scientific and intellectual interest, and could, if so utilized, provide an improved basis for wise decisions on policy."

JAMES BURNHAM

Kent, Connecticut
September, 1960

World History

For centuries the relations between China and Russia have swung between extremes of conflicts and friendship. Which will prevail tomorrow?

The problem of Sino-Russian relations is but one facet of the immense subject of relations between different societies and civilizations. Since the dawn of history these have always been marked by incessant rivalry which in moments of great stress has ripened into armed conflict.

Direct analysis will show that Sino-Russian relations conform to this age-old pattern. Ever since Russia conquered the eastern regions of Siberia, and in the middle of the seventeenth century came into contact with the Chinese sphere of interest, her relations with China have been characterized by rivalry and wars. These began with the frequent clashes between Russian conquistadors and scattered Chinese military units that were temporarily halted by the Treaty of 1689, under which China kept the Amur river. Lacking bases from which to attack, Russia was compelled to restrain her expansionist dynamism in the Far East, and to limit herself to slow colonization along with trade.

This trend was sharply reversed in the middle of the nineteenth century, when Russia turned to open penetration and seizure of the northern and northwestern provinces of China. Between the treaty of Aigun in 1858 and the end of the century Russia won a series of concessions as a result of which she was able to acquire vast areas on the left bank of the Amur, conquer the rich province of Ussuri, and occupy ports on the Pacific Ocean. After settling in western Turkestan, Russia gained trade privileges in China proper and began the penetration of eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang). Even Tibetan affairs and Franco-Siamese quarrels evoked lively interest in St. Petersburg.

Among the major steps by which Russia reached the warm waters of

the Pacific at the end of the nineteenth century were the concessions extracted from China in 1896 for the building of the Chinese Eastern Railroad that was to connect eastern Siberia with Vladivostok and secure a dominant position for Russia in Manchuria. A show of force in the Pacific by the Russian Navy secured a lease on Port Arthur and Port Dalny, with the right to build spur lines to those two cities. In 1900 Russia's participation in the quelling of the Boxer movement placed Russian troops for more than a year in the Chinese capital of Peking. By forcing China to grant autonomy to Outer Mongolia through treaties signed in 1913 and 1915, Russia opened the door to an unhampered take-over of the country.

World War I Plans

During World War I, Russia's plans in China were ambitious. In the event of the confidently expected victory, Russia was to annex and incorporate within her frontiers all the Asian border regions. One sponsor of this plan—the then Governor General of Turkestan, Aleksey N. Kuropatkin (1848-1925)—reported to the Czar that the postwar security of the Turkestan border demanded the return to Russia of the Persian provinces of Astarabad, Gilan and Mazandaran, "the heritage of Peter the Great," as well as establishment of a Russian protectorate over the Tabriz, Meshed and Teheran areas. Within Afghanistan, Russia would take control of the Amu-Darya and Mugrab rivers and the Tedjen; would open the country to Russian trade, and would build a railroad through to India. As for China, Kuropatkin wanted a new border drawn from the Khan Tengri Range (in Tian-Shan) to Vladivostok,

WLODZIMIERZ BACZKOWSKI

thereby placing northern Mongolia, the Kuldja, and northern Manchuria inside the Russian Empire.¹

The general pattern of Russian policy toward China was not very much different from that of the other European powers. Although Russia did not follow their example of fostering religious missions, she promoted her interests by spreading the Russian language and Russian culture. The Chinese Eastern Railroad, cutting through Manchuria, was in reality an extension of Russia, and all Manchuria was being rapidly transformed into a Russian province. A Russian atmosphere and Russian customs soon prevailed in Port Arthur and Dalny. Relations with the native population began to resemble those in British colonies. The haughty representatives of the Russian Empire regarded the Chinese *hodia* as a mark of inferior race.

In spite of some surface appearances, the situation following the Russian Revolution of 1917 showed few changes of real benefit to China. True enough, the Kremlin renounced Czarist privileges in China, and supported China's struggle for freedom from Western influence with propaganda and diversionary tactics, but it showed little respect for Chinese sovereignty or forms of government. Through the Comintern (organized in 1919) and the Chinese Communist Party (organized in 1921), communist Russia was undermining the existing Chinese regime and subverting the ruling nationalist Kuomintang party. Russian tactics were instrumental in preventing a stabilization of the internal Chinese political situation and a peaceful development of economic and social reforms.

¹ "The Kirgiz Rebellion of 1916," *Novy Vostok*, Vol. VI, p. 270, as quoted by Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky in *Russia and Asia*, New York, 1933.

There is ample evidence from Soviet actions in the period immediately following the Japanese surrender in August, 1945 that the Soviet Union regarded non-communist China as an enemy. The most obviously inimical gesture in those years was the wholesale looting of equipment from heavy industrial and defense plants in Manchuria, after Japan's surrender, and its shipment to Russia as "war booty."

Sino-Soviet Similarities

The history of relations between peoples reveals that, besides the powerful currents of rivalry and war, there is also a recurrent impulse toward the peaceful coexistence even of radically different societies. Such a tendency is discovered when great empires are constructed out of heterogeneous nations, as in the instances of the Roman, Islamic, British and French empires. There thus arises the question whether future historians will find Sino-Soviet relations to be a new proof that two dissimilar powers can live together peacefully within the framework of a common democratic empire. Russia's great empire-building talents, proved by the creation and endurance of the multi-national Russian state, as well as Chinese political and national tradition, seem to support an affirmative answer.

There are many factors that favor an amicable Sino-Soviet coexistence. History shows that China—like the ancient countries of Mesopotamia and Egypt—created its own highly developed method of carrying out gigantic projects through a centralized governing body and a total mobilization of the population.

Soviet plans for rapid industrialization, agrarian collectives and thought control are, essentially, new forms of ancient Chinese plans for vast irrigation works, great defense walls against invasion, ambitious colonization drives, etc. Some historians even lean to the theory that the pre-revolutionary Czarist regime in Russia, especially prior to Peter the Great, was in many respects akin to Chinese, Persian and Byzantine prototypes. Dr. Karl Wittfogel, for example, has described China as the world's cradle of totalitarianism, planned economy and super-bureaucracy. According to this author, Russia is in these matters

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a Chinese marginal area, a sort of Chinese borderland.²

It is thus safe to assume that when the present rulers of the two countries discuss industrialization, collectivization campaigns or far-reaching expansion programs, they do so in terms that have on both sides an old, familiar ring.

Hatred of the West

Moreover, certain mental and psychological traits help to bring Russians and Chinese closer together. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon, Germanic and some Romance peoples, who can be influenced by dispassionate reflection, the Chinese and the Slavs are swayed primarily by emotions, faith and non-rational beliefs. Thus the new Russian and Chinese ideology, even though atheistic, rather easily replaces religions. The passions and longings fanned by the new ideology take on the earmarks of religious fanaticism and become powerful stimulants of the sociological dynamism. Both countries are passionately envious of the Western world and its riches; and as a result acquire a hatred of everything Western—a sentiment nursed and sustained by a systematic indoctrination which harps on the real and imaginary wrongs allegedly inflicted on Asia and Russia in the past by Western nations.

Even some of the leading pre-revolutionary Russian intellectuals expressed spiritual kinship with China and Asia. Prince Esper Ukhtomsky, traveling companion of Crown Prince Nicholas during that future Czar's travels in Asia in 1890-91, wrote about "the brotherly and close spiritual ties with Asia." Russia, he

declared, is also Asia, and Russia's historic mission is to lead the East. "Asia is now suffering because it is aware of the unbridgeable chasm between herself and the West, while there are no barriers between our creative chaos and that of China." Nothing is easier for Russians (he continues) than to deal with Asians. Between the peoples of the East and the Russians there is such a consensus on most vital problems that spiritual kinship is easily discernible. "There is only one alternative for the All-Russian empire," Ukhtomsky concluded. "Either to become a world power that in itself embraces both West and East—and Russia is destined to be such a power—or to follow, inconspicuously and ingloriously, a path of decline in the course of which Europe will eventually crush us by its superior material strength." An awakening of Asian nations without Russia's prodding, Ukhtomsky added, would be much more dangerous for Russians than the threats from their Western neighbors.

Soviet authors who write about Sino-Soviet friendship naturally ignore the aristocrat, Ukhtomsky. In his place they quote the noted revolutionary and materialist, N. G. Chernyshevsky (1828-1889), who violently denounced the policy followed by the Western powers in China dur-

ing the Opium War, and wrote approvingly of the Tai-ping movement. Other Russian authors who wrote about China with sympathy and admiration, and who nowadays are much quoted by Soviet writers, include the famous novelist, I. A. Goncharov (1812-1891), and the physician, P. Y. Piasetsky, a member of the Russian expedition to China in 1875-1877.

However, the most frequently quoted of all protagonists of Sino-Russian friendship is the world-famous scientist, D. I. Mendeleyev (1834-1907), who, though known chiefly as a chemist, was also prominent as a philosopher and geopolitician. He taught the necessity of the most cordial relations with China. In his last statement, *Thoughts for Posterity*, he wrote: "It is desirable that



² Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, New Haven, 1957. Russian historians who attribute a decisive role to Oriental factors in the development of the Russian state and society include: N. Karamzin (1766-1826); V. O. Kuchesky (1841-1911), in part; N. Kostomarov (1817-1885); M. Pokrovsky (1868-1932).

Russia conclude the closest political and every other sort of alliance with China, which is an awakening country of 450 million inhabitants, and has, like Russia, every opportunity of becoming the most powerful state in the world. . . . If she secures the friendship of that most numerous people of the world, Mendeleyev reasoned, Russia may face with equanimity the changes that the twentieth century will bring.

The above-quoted examples of pro-Chinese sentiments are more than the isolated opinions of a few individuals. In truth, they mirror the innate and subconscious leanings of the Russian people toward the East, and their distrust of the West. This was the tendency also of the Russian slavophiles of the nineteenth century, who believed that Russia belonged neither to East nor to West, but who, psychologically, broke the ground for the rapprochement of a considerable part of the Europeanized Russian elite with the East.

Similar leanings may also be found in statements of Russian religious leaders, especially those of sectarian and non-ecclesiastical trends—conspicuous among them the great novelist, Leo Tolstoy. In his letters to the Chinese, Tolstoy counseled them not to introduce reforms in the liberal European tradition, but to seek a Chinese solution to their problems. He also advised them to fight Western oppression by passive resistance—a recommendation he repeated in his letters written in 1908 to Hindus, which became a key influence on Gandhi's choice of strategy.

The Qualitative Strategy

The Russian revolution of 1917 begins a new era in Sino-Russian relations. The change was foreseen by Lenin, who asserted after the Chinese revolution of 1911 that events in China were of such world-wide importance that they would engulf Asia and stop the West.³ But before the revolution could get into full swing in China, the Kremlin's attention was drawn to events in Germany and Hungary and to the Soviet-Polish war of 1920. It was not until 1923-24, when it abandoned hope for a victory of the Western proletariat, that the

Kremlin again focused on Asia and the colonial hinterlands of the Western powers. Lenin described this shift in one of his last pronouncements in this field. In the article entitled, "Better Less but Better," written in 1923, he wrote that the hope for the final triumph of the revolution is based on the fact that the peoples of Russia, China, India, etc., comprising the overwhelming majority of the human

Predicated upon such premises, Soviet plans for China were lifted to the level of global grand strategy, backed by a readiness for any sacrifice in the struggle to absorb China and the other countries of Asia. Between the two world wars this Soviet willingness to accept any required sacrifice was not apparent to the Western leaders, whose diplomatic eyes were focused on the steadily growing tensions along the western Soviet borders. It became obvious only after World War II and the sovietization of China in 1949.

Mutual Bonds Tighten

Three striking facts symbolize the content of the Kremlin's new policy toward China: the voluntary withdrawal of Soviet officials and units from the administration of Port Arthur and Dalny, which were under lease to the Soviet Union; the voluntary withdrawal of the co-administrators of the Manchurian railroads; and the further voluntary withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria. There are no precedents in Russian history for such actions. Also without precedent is the scope and volume of Soviet aid in the development of China's military, industrial and political potential. A proper evaluation of this aid can be made only by remembering Russia's shortages at home and the low standard of living of Soviet citizens.

The impact of this new phase of Sino-Soviet relations is so deep and pervasive that even the divergent views of Chinese and Russian leaders on current internal and international problems must be understood within the specific context which it determines. The respective leaders differ not in the essentials of policy, not about the necessity for cooperation and for the pursuit of common objectives, but about some of the methods for realizing the Marxist-Leninist aims, and for reaching in the shortest possible time the next stage on the road to the final goal. It may seem paradoxical to state the truth that the leaders of China and Russia differ not in matters that divide them, but in matters that unite them. In Mao Tse-tung's words, the differences between China and the Soviet Union are "non-antagonistic"; and such differences not only do not hinder



race, are being drawn with great speed into the fight for emancipation.

What this really meant was that the Kremlin's *creative* foreign policy was veering slowly toward Asia and the colonial empires of the Western nations. For obvious reasons, Western foreign policy-makers failed to notice this shift. Western statesmen were misled by the fact that the Soviet governmental apparatus, fearing an attack on the western borders of Soviet Russia, continued to be preoccupied in its *conventional*, diplomatic activities by relations with the Western powers.

Thus two separate and distinct lines of Soviet policy were developed: one, which we may call the *qualitative* policy, concerned itself with Asian countries; the second, which we may call the *quantitative* policy, concerned itself principally with Soviet relations to Europe and the Western world.

The primary aims of the quantitative policy were the defense of the Soviet borders and the postponement of "the final and decisive battle" for world rule to a time chosen by the Kremlin.

It was the qualitative strategy that expressed the ultimate goals of the communist leadership and the basic tenets of Soviet strategy. Success for the creative, expansive qualitative policy meant general victory for the communist enterprise; failure meant a slow disintegration of communism within the narrow confines of the Soviet state.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 4th ed., Vol. 17, p. 435.

cooperation, but, on the contrary, stimulate progress.⁴ This explains why each crisis in Sino-Soviet relations has served only to tighten, not to loosen, their mutual bonds.

Cooperation Predicted

Thus, we find in the over-all history of Sino-Russian relations two clearly defined currents: one of strife and suspicion; the other of cooperation and friendship. Which of the two will prevail in this decisive hour of world history? Nobody knows, of course, with complete certainty, but it seems probable that it will be the tendency toward friendship and cooperation.

Apart from the factors already discussed, this prediction is based on a number of developments of much greater importance than the Russian Revolution of 1917 or the events in China since World War II. One of these—which became apparent long before the Russian and Chinese revolutions—is the gradual decay in both countries of nationalistic civilization and consciousness of specific national destiny.

Since the nineteenth century both Russia and China have been gradually losing the innate traits of dynamic, individual historic entities, and have been slowly transforming themselves into societies lacking both originality of thought and indigenous policy. Traditionally theocracies, they broke away from religion; having had authoritarian governments from time immemorial, they experimented with Western types of democracy; lacking their own traditions in pure science and modern technology, they suddenly began to believe that their future development was dependent upon the supreme power of science and technology. In the course of the cataclysmic changes that befell both countries, they were slowly losing the native ideologies and civilizations which, differing so widely, had in the past been repellent to each other. Russia was ending her spiritual battle against the "barbarian" steppes, against the "yellow peril," and against the Latin "heretics" of the West—thus forgetting her mission to establish a Slav-

⁴ "In Connection with the Problem of the Right Solution of Contradictions within the Nation," *Pravda*, June 19, 1957.



Orthodox world empire which would fuse in itself the "rotten" East and the "declining" West. At about the same time, China was ending her attempted progress from an archaic past to a modern Westernized nation—a form which she could neither understand easily nor assimilate with a Japanese tempo.

Meanwhile both nations were creating internal conditions destined to draw them closer together politically, ideologically, and even culturally. The disappearance of their former "historic missions" and native civilizations was accompanied in both countries by a fading of their temporarily assumed socio-economic structures and ideas. Thus the gates were opened to a new social and economic system of a radical type. The foundations were laid in both countries for the eventual victory of Marxism-Leninism.

To sum up: the two most decisive factors affecting recent Sino-Soviet relations are: 1) the eclipse of the traditional forms of civilization that had always in the past caused frictions between the two countries; and 2) the emergence in both countries of a Leninist-Maoist ideology that tends to unite them. It is a special and determining feature of this process that Leninism-Maoism did not have to supplant a live and dynamic ideology in either country. In both, it filled a void left by the decay of traditional values that were not replaced by adequately dynamic new values.

This may explain why the Soviet Union is building a powerful China—an action that is contrary to the best interests of historical Russia. It also explains why the new elite of an ancient and proud Chinese nation consented to obey the dictates of an international enterprise centered in "barbarian" Moscow.

There is another link in Sino-Soviet relations that tends to hold the

two countries close together: the similarity in their political and military strategies Russia modeled her strategy on Chinese, Mongol and Persian-Byzantine patterns, a fact noted by several Russian historians both before and after the 1917 Revolution. For example, in 1875 Prince Golitzin, a member of the military-scientific committee of the Russian General Staff, recommended the book by General M. Ivanin about the Mongol art of war. He wrote that General Ivanin explained how the military system of Jenghiz Khan had been partly assimilated by the Russians during two centuries of Tatar captivity, and had entered into their customs and habits in the period preceding the reforms of Peter the Great.⁵

The Soviet General A. Svechin also acknowledged the debt of Russia to the Eastern peoples: "We have borrowed from the East a deep respect for accurate shooting, for leading an army into battle from the rear, for division of a big army into right and left wings and into vanguards and reserves, for organizing light cavalry to fight like infantry; and we have learned to attach great importance to espionage and the security services."⁶

Alike in War Tactics

For Chinese observers also, the Soviet-Russian art of war appears to be essentially oriental. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stated in his book published in 1957 that Soviet military strategy represented a combination of the theories of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, the famous Chinese strategist of 500 B. C. In their study of military art, according to Chiang, the Russian communists have paid particular attention to the theories and principles which Sun Tzu and Jenghiz Khan propounded.

The following excerpts from Sun Tzu's writings on strategy⁸ show striking resemblances to the Soviet-communist strategy of stratagem:

⁵ Gen. M. Ivanin, *On Military Art and on the Conquests of the Tatar-Mongols*, St. Petersburg, 1875.

⁶ Gen. A. Svechin, *Evolution of Military Art*, Moscow, 1927-8.

⁷ Chiang Chung-cheng (Chiang Kai-shek), *Soviet Russia in China*, New York, 1957.

⁸ Lionel Giles, *Sun Tzu on the Art of War*, London, 1910; and I. I. Konrad, *Sun-Tzu, Traktat o voyennom iskustve*, Moscow-Lenin-grad, 1950.

All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must make an impression to be unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. . . .

Pretend meekness to make the enemy overconfident. When the enemy's morale begins to crumble, pretend that your own army also is tired and weak. Should unrest break out in the enemy's camp, pretend that similar unrest is rife within your ranks. Simulated disorders postulate perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. Hiding beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy . . .

Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are as inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent, and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.



The Mongolian art of war was similar. Basing their foreign and military policy on an excellent intelligence system and secret service, the Mongols almost never faced defeat, because their army was employed only in the final stages of conflict, after extensive subversive activities in the country which they intended to conquer. Long before actual battles were started, the Asian chiefs collected detailed information about their adversary. They minutely studied the physiographical conditions, as well as the military, political, economic, social and religious situation. This espionage, practiced on a very high level, assured the Mongol chiefs of a detailed knowledge of conditions, means, resources and morale within

the theater of future operations.

Mongolian emissaries, working in close cooperation with general headquarters and using the information obtained from the intelligence service and local agents, carried on a lively activity. They instigated racial wrangles, regional, national and religious struggles, in order to provoke discord among the population and rebellion in the army. Simultaneously the Mongolian diplomats sought to isolate the adversary from his allies.⁹

The close relationship between Soviet and Chinese tactics and strategy is based not only on common Chinese and more generally oriental patterns, but also on indigenous Russian-Soviet ideas. Leninist strategy has had its reciprocal influence on present Chinese concepts of strategy and tactics, as is amply revealed in the writings of Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese communist leaders, which frequently quote Lenin approvingly and advocate policies in line with his teachings.

Moscow's influence on China in the sphere of strategy and tactics is extensive and deep because both countries derive their basic doctrine from closely related sources. The application of Leninist strategy on Chinese territory is in reality a return home of the older Chinese and oriental strategy that in a new form boomerangs back from Russia to China.

Thus, China and the Soviet Union understand each other not only because they share the same ideology, but because their operational methods are much the same. Acting in concert, they take pains to camouflage the closeness of their alliance and to deceive the West with stories of internal quarrels and conflicts.

There is another aspect of the present relationship of the two countries that is frequently overlooked. China is a country that throughout a long history has usually been ruled by an omnipotent and easily corruptible officialdom. This mode of govern-

⁹ W. Zatorski, *Jenghiz Khan*, Warsaw, 1939.

ment has often caused widespread opposition among the masses, has led to the counter-formation of numerous secret societies, and has from time to time erupted in peasant uprisings which have toppled dynasties and regimes. But this recurrent pattern has now been changed. Thanks to the close ideological and strategic alliance between China and Soviet Russia, any rebellious move against either regime would be crushed by the combined power of both, as in Hungary in 1956.

China is compelled to uphold the present regime in the Soviet Union in order to assure the uninterrupted flow of Soviet material aid; which is mandatory for China's development, and the *raison d'être* of the Chinese Communist Party. If this massive flow of goods and weapons is to continue, the present Russian regime must be not merely maintained, but kept at the highest ideological pitch.

The Kremlin acts from similar motives. The fall of the present form of government in China would be a major disaster for the Soviet Union. It would end the Kremlin's grandiose plans, and would endanger the motherland of the revolution and the empire of the Russian people. It is in communist Russia's best interests to preserve a pure Marxist-Leninist line in Peking.

Under such conditions, there is little chance for the successful organization of secret societies, or for staging rebellions in either China or Russia. Any sign of serious opposition in either country would be promptly stamped out not only by the police and armed forces of that country, but also by those of the neighbor. The first condition for successful uprisings is that they should occur simultaneously in the two countries; and this is too much to hope for. Sino-Soviet amity and co-operation must be recognized as principal and constant factors of the present era of world conflict.

Russian History

The Communists themselves may not understand how the past history of both Russia and China opened the road to common totalitarian victory.

Relations between the governments of China and Russia reach far back into history. Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic began with the Sino-Soviet treaty of February 1950, but the more important fact is that intimate contacts between the two Communist Parties now ruling these countries date from 1921, when the Soviet Party assisted in the foundation of the Chinese Party. The Russian Empire and the Chinese Empire first established official relations in the Treaty of Nerchinsk, signed in 1689. But at a much earlier time Russia and China were in close contact, when both were parts of a larger empire, that of the Mongols, founded in the thirteenth century.

Rather than trace the course of diplomacy or official relations between the two countries—this has been done by a number of scholars—I will attempt a brief examination of the main features of Russian social organization and thought in comparison to the society and thought of China, in order to suggest some of the reasons why communists were able to come to power in both.

Power Diversified

The first organized state of the Eastern Slavs, who later became differentiated into Russians, Byelorussians, and Ukrainians, was known as Kievan Rus. The first princes were Norsemen, ruling in Kiev from the middle of the ninth century A.D. They accepted Christianity and thereupon entered into the circle of European civilization in 988 A.D., within the period when the very phrase "European civilization" was for the first time assuming clear meaning.

For the next two centuries and a

half Kievan Rus and the semi-independent principalities into which the Kievan state, in the early twelfth century, dissolved developed a kind of society not radically different from that of the other ex-barbarian European states of the time. Kievan Rus knew princely government, and also the influence of noble councils and popular assemblies on it; there was a hereditary nobility which served the princes, not under the classic feudal pattern of contract, but still retaining an important series of rights and privileges; there were peasants who had various degrees of obligations to the nobles or princes or church authorities on whose lands they lived, and free and independent farmers, as well as slaves; there was a sizable class of merchants and traders. It was a kind of society in which Christian and barbarian legal notions were intermingled and to some extent codified, and in which a powerful clergy undertook to uphold Christian ethical norms and the independence of the Russian Orthodox church, against the princes when necessary. In summary, it was a society in which elements of diversity and unity could both be found, a society which could be called multi-centered.

In China some of the same elements could have been found in the society which preceded the Ch'in dynasty, established in 221 B.C., but after that time China developed as an empire whose power was centralized in an emperor and his scholar-officials, one in which no nation-wide class or institution could resist the imperial power beyond a certain point, or establish effective limits on the exercise of such power. China thus experienced a despotic state system for fourteen hundred years before Rus-

DONALD W. TREADGOLD

sia, at the time of the Mongol conquest, fell under the control of a similar authority.

When Russia was overcome by the Mongols, beginning in 1237, the latter had already destroyed the Chin state of north China and, working through a Sinicized chancellor, Yelü Ch'u-ts'ai, in effect re-established the old Chinese system in the north under Mongol overlordship. Shortly afterward the Mongol prince Kublai proclaimed himself first emperor of the Yüan dynasty, which ruled China from 1271 to 1368. The outlying regions of the Mongol Empire, such as Russia, experienced the introduction of certain Chinese bureaucratic devices, though Russia was governed for the most part indirectly and rather loosely by the khans of the so-called Golden Horde, with headquarters on the lower Volga, as part of the larger Mongol domain.

With Kiev devastated, the Russian principalities in the upper Volga basin rose to prominence with the acquiescence of the khans of the Golden Horde. The descendants of Alexander Nevsky, Grand Prince of Vladimir, more particularly those who came in the line of Prince Daniel of Moscow, followed a policy of loyalty to the Mongols, who in turn allowed them to assume powers of tribute collection and to annex their weaker neighbor principalities bit by bit. The Mongols were overthrown in China by the founders of the native Ming dynasty in 1368, and the whole empire experienced a series of upheavals from which the Moscow princes profited to establish their factual independence of the Golden Horde, ending the "Tatar Yoke," around 1450.

The Russia which emerged from the period of Mongol rule was no

longer a federation of semi-independent principalities. Ivan III of Moscow (1462-1505) completed, with trifling exceptions, the task which his predecessors had painfully advanced, that of bringing all Great Russian states under the rule of the Muscovite Czardom, as it was now styled. In China the end of Mongol rule brought with it no need to restore the pre-Mongol state system; this had already been adopted by the Mongols themselves. In Russia there was an effort by the Muscovite Czars to regain what they claimed to be their "patrimony": this meant all the lands once ruled by the House of Riurik in Kievan days; and in fact this objective was pursued, by the Czars and then the Emperors who followed Peter the Great's assumption of that title in 1721, until achieved in the reign of Catherine the Great (1762-1796). However, the Czars neither sought to restore the multi-centered system of state and society of Kievan days nor did they in fact do so. What emerged in the Russia of the immediately post-Mongol or Muscovite period was a "state stronger than society," as a great Russian historian termed it—that is, a despotic state, in which no single class or institution strong enough to challenge the state's power remained at the end of the period.

Factors for Autocracy

Historians have debated hotly and at length whether the emergence of Russian despotism or "autocracy" is to be explained by the influence of the Mongols, the heritage of Byzantium, the necessity to wage war for two centuries and a half against Muscovy's enemies—notably the Tatar succession states into which the Golden Horde broke up—or a combination of these and other factors. Sometimes the debate has served virtually to obscure the wide agreement among scholars that Russia by the time of Peter the Great was a single-centered society. The Autocrats of all the Russias had destroyed the old hereditary nobility and bound a new nobility fast to lifelong state service, bound the entire peasantry in serfdom either to the landlords who were themselves the Czar's servants or to the Czarist state directly, laid heavy and fixed obligations on the towns-

men, and, after a long struggle, had brought the Orthodox Church under the direct administration of the central government.

Apparently no systematic attempt has been made to compare Ming China with Muscovite Russia in order to determine the Mongol impact on the two. There may be some points of similarity. Trade routes by land across Eurasia flourished under the Mongols, and withered as their empire broke up, with effects on the economic life of both countries. European contacts, vigorous in pre-Mongol Russia and just beginning in early Mongol China, were interrupted by the Mongol conquest in Russia and as the Mongols weakened in China, and something like a rediscovery of both had to be undertaken by seagoing Europeans in the sixteenth century, with increasing intellectual impact in succeeding centuries in both countries. In the post-Mongol period the rulers of both made serious though perhaps somewhat artificial efforts to obtain ideological strength by invoking a real or imagined nativist past, in Ming China by supporting neo-Confucian teachings, in Muscovite Russia by teaching the purity of Russian Orthodoxy as against "heretical" Roman Catholicism and the Orthodoxy of fallen Byzantium.

But there were also differences, fundamental among them the fact that while in post-Mongol Russia despotism was new, in post-Mongol China it was almost nineteen centuries old. It should be added that as Yuan China was livelier and more intellectually vigorous than Ming China, so Russia under the Mongols enjoyed its last great artistic age before the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Russian society, after the initial shock of the conquest, was left alone—so that, for example, the

Church had greater independence under the Mongols than under the Moscow Czars. It was, then, not the Mongols themselves who should suffer all the blame for the sharp turn Russia's institutional development took after 1450.

The policies and practices of the Muscovite court were, by comparison with those of the earlier Kievan princes, ritualized, barbarous, and



antagonistic to foreign influences (even though, and perhaps partly because, such influences made substantial headway). The brutality exhibited by Ivan the Terrible was a special case of a more general characteristic of Czarist practice. From the mounting arbitrariness of Autocracy and the sharper exactions of serfdom multitudes of peasants and other ranks fled southward and eastward in search of freedom. To such men are to be credited the crude but proud self-government of the new Cossack bands in the south and the speed and sureness of the exploration of Siberia in a great age of overland discovery.

Nevertheless, the Muscovite state expanded behind the pioneers and annexed the territories into which they had ventured, and by the time of Peter the Great the domain of the Czars reached from the Baltic to the Pacific. In all of that vast territory Moscow's writ could not run evenly, and many evaded the tax-collectors and recruiting officers, but the power of the Czar had become more unlimited than ever even though it could not be systematically enforced everywhere. For a time it had seemed that some effective checks might be found. The hereditary nobles resisted Ivan the Terrible, and in the Time of Troubles (1598-1613) which followed made several efforts to establish some kind of aristocratic rule. A na-

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tional assembly of heterogeneous and fluctuating composition, the Zemsky Sobor, developed and for a short time met regularly. High clerics set forth claims that the church should be independent or even supreme over state power. But the nobles failed and were absorbed into the serving class, the national assembly disappeared, and the church was subjugated.

Peter the Great inherited this system and he enforced and perfected it with great ruthlessness. His reign marks an important divide in the flow of Russian history, aside from his assumption of the title of Emperor. The Empire, with its new capital in St. Petersburg, presented an interesting and deep contradiction between the Europeanizing ambitions of Peter and the semi-Asiatic lineaments of the state, which had bound all segments of society more tightly than ever to its needs and demands. Peter's ambitions were regarded ambivalently by the serving nobility during his lifetime, but he nevertheless set in motion a lasting series of contacts with the West, ranging from the habit of dynastic marriage with Germans through the systematic importation of Western technicians and scholars of all kinds to the great increase of movement of young Russian aristocrats to the West for recreation and education. Under his successor sovereigns of the eighteenth century, most of them transitory dynastic mishaps, the serving nobility gradually won its independence of state service. Upon this grant Catherine the Great (1762-96) put her seal of acceptance, and yet it was a conditional sort of grant and the habits of submission could not so easily be cast off. The Autocracy remained intact, and beginning with Catherine a series of strong if not always capable sovereigns sought to maintain it—but in the nineteenth century, also, to use it as an instrument for modernizing Russia and to some extent for reforming it.

Early Chinese Mistrust

While the Romanovs turned their face to the West and wholeheartedly accepted at least one part of its tradition—that of Germanic bureaucratic absolutism along with some Protestant conceptions—the Ch'ing

emperors of China reacted quite differently. Western traders and missionaries in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries operated within very narrowly restricted limits, and the minor wars with European powers beginning in 1840 deepened the distrust of the West without spurring any other efforts than to improve Chinese capacity for military resistance. Not long before a Russian sovereign virtually presided at a great European peace conference in 1814-15, the Chinese emperor expressed his disdain of European kings and at most a willingness to accept their homage to the ruler of the Middle Kingdom. At a time when a small but enthusiastic and vigorous Euro-

peanized intelligentsia had appeared in Russia, such a phenomenon in China lay a hundred years in the future.

No Basis for Democracy

The last Romanov was brought, under the impact of revolt and the urging of capable ministers, to grant a series of reforms. He established a legislative assembly and granted civil liberties including religious toleration (some of which were subsequently abridged but not abolished). His ministers and the assembly pushed through labor legislation and planned for universal education in a decade. In China, in the very last years of the dynasty, plans were announced for a parliament and other reforms including mass education, but the Revolution of 1911 overtook them. In retrospect it seems clear that the Ch'ing reforms were far too little and too late to satisfy the small but influential group of Westernized intellectuals which had come into being, or to enable the government to mobilize the mass support needed to restore real national unity. The Romanov reforms came earlier and more nearly approached the achievement of their objective.

What doomed the Romanovs was the grievous burden of World War I, coming at a time when the bureaucracy had shown its worst traits. What doomed the Ch'ing was no immediate outside force, but the maturing of an internal ailment of long standing, intensified for decades by inability to meet the Western imperialist challenge until Western forces were actually and firmly established on Chinese soil. The two dynasties could be more easily overthrown, in the twentieth century, than replaced by a modern government. What was lacking in both countries was not the will of Westernized leaders to construct one, but the habits of constitutional government, a strong legal tradition, and perhaps most fundamentally, a disciplined social cohesion stemming from the long possession of rights and self-consciousness by social groupings independent of state control. The prerequisites of freedom proved to be, in both Russia and China, not the proclamation of



Peter the Great

peanized intelligentsia had appeared in Russia, such a phenomenon in China lay a hundred years in the future.

In the nineteenth century the reformist efforts of the Russian Autocrats culminated in the Emancipation and the other so-called "Great Reforms" of Alexander II in the 1860's, and in the subsequent debates about how far they should be extended (although under his successor there was a brief effort to limit and abridge them). A variety of circumstances, including the dynasty's fear of the growing and fanatical revolutionary movement, led to the temporary dampening down of further reformist efforts. Such efforts were resumed, however, in Russia and seriously begun in China at about the same time, around the turn of the twentieth century. One difference was that the Ch'ing dynasty had been weakened by the growth in power of local authorities following the repression of the severe T'ai-p'ing rebellion (1853-

constitutional and democratic forms, but the characteristics of an open society. Thus there ensued in both countries a prolonged period of chaos and violence, ended in Russia when the Bolsheviks restored order in 1921, in China when the Kuomintang completed the Northern Expedition in 1928—only to suffer in turn the fate of the Romanovs, that of being caught in a gigantic war which forced the setting aside of plans for reform, and which resulted in loss of power.

Growth of Ideas

Despite the persistence after conversion of pagan legends and superstitions in a fashion common to other newly Christianized barbarians, the Russians adopted Christianity in the ninth and tenth centuries. Of the three ideals which were formulated for the West by the Greeks and retained by Christian philosophers, it can be said that the Russians, from the first Kievan saints and artists to the great nineteenth-century novelists, were more preoccupied with goodness and beauty than with truth. Ethics and aesthetics, in precept and practice rather than theory, interested them more than metaphysics or indeed systematic philosophy of any kind. The use of Church Slavonic for the liturgy made Greek more dispensable to those clergy who were literate than Latin was to the clergy of the West, and indeed only a portion of the treasures of Greek learning reached Russia, there to have only a small audience.

The intellectual achievements of the High Middle Ages in the West remained unknown to Russia, and the ideas of the Renaissance, Reformation, and Catholic Reform, while Russia was by no means insulated from them, still arrived only in truncated and distorted guise. Many Roman Catholic ideas were transmitted to Muscovy. Some interesting parallels appear in Western and Russian religious history—for example, that of the Council of Trent with the Russian Council of a Hundred Chapters—and admiration for Roman Catholicism was shown by laymen and high clergy (above all Patriarch Nikon) in the seventeenth century. Many Protestant ideas were brought in a little later. They helped to shape Peter's seizure

of control over the church, and inspired Alexander I's pietism and his notion of the Holy Alliance. But the habits of disciplined and systematic thought had never been developed, and neither Aquinas' or Calvin's rigor of exposition ever found emulators in Russia.

When the post-French Revolutionary philosophers and political thinkers of the West became known in Russia, they were embraced with fervor. There may be recalled Alexander Herzen, humane and undogmatic in his ideas, who broke friendships over Hegel and burned with passion on reading the French socialists. Fleeting phases of attachment to one Western thinker or another resembled affairs of the heart more than intellectual positions taken. As the century wore on, the radicals—and the radicals in word rather than in deed (though the former were ready enough for action, as the Bolsheviks proved)—consistently outcompeted the more moderate spirits. The populists were silenced by the Marxists, the Mensheviks by the Bolsheviks, the liberals by the socialists as a whole. The triumph of Lenin's uncompromising April Theses in the revolutionary babel of 1917 was foreshadowed by the defeats of moderate and realistic men for decades before. Russia's thinkers had not been tempered and trained in the center



of Europe's philosophical tradition; they had danced at the edge of the fire, intoxicated by the sparks, but neither wearied by the labor of building nor warmed by the flame itself. That did

not make the most uncompromising thinkers the inevitable victors, but it handicapped the soberer spirits, and indeed men who were both sober and profound in thought were rare in the early twentieth century.

If Russian thinkers were not restrained by the philosophical experience of centuries in Europe, however, they still shared with the West the idiom of a Christian tradition and had been exposed to the categories of European philosophy in common with it. Chinese thinkers of the early twentieth century, however, had virtually no preparation for the Western intellectual impact. They were familiar,

not with analysis, but precept; not with philosophical categories, but lists of virtues, elements, and relationships; not with historical investigation, but memorization of words of timeless wisdom; not with rational argument, but with ritualized personal pressures. Not habituated to Western philosophical thought, the Chinese literati were still less familiar with political organization and movement in the Western sense, and lacked even the experience of the Russian intelligentsia in this respect.

Neither in Russia nor in China were present the safeguards which have protected the West (except for Nazi Germany, which would require separate discussion) from the logical consequences of its extremist doctrines. Neither a pluralistic society nor a systematic philosophical tradition founded on absolute values stood in the way. It proved impossible, whether or not inevitably so, to borrow the fruits of twenty-five centuries of Western growth without paying more attention to cultivating the tree.

Russian-Chinese Attitudes

For centuries before the middle of the nineteenth, Russians and Chinese were scarcely aware of each other; or, more accurately, had forgotten the awareness they had had to some extent in Mongol times. By 1850 Russian intellectuals saw themselves as Europeans, and if some of them, such as Chaadaev, spoke of Asiatic strains, they did so mainly in order to shock their fellows into more rapid Westernization. In dealings with the Moslem Tatars, for example, they saw themselves as "Christians" as against "heathen," though such contacts were easier than between West Europeans and the Asians they found at the end of sea voyages. Similarly Chinese thinkers—and common people—regarded the Russians as like other Europeans, not only from their appearance and language but from the behavior of the government.

The somewhat sudden entry of the Russian Empire into the combined assault on Chinese integrity by the Powers came in 1858-60. Although this should have been enough for a warning, Chinese often regarded Russia as a lesser evil *vis-à-vis* Japan, whose transformation struck

the Chinese with envy and fear. The Russians had less racial pride than some other Europeans, and their national strength seemed less dramatically threatening than, say, England's. When Sun Yat-sen welcomed the Revolution of 1917 as marking the "break-away of the Slavs" from Europe, he was intending a compliment to a people he regarded as basically European. A few Chinese (for example, the censor Wei Mu-t'ing in 1861) sensed in Russia the partially successful result of a great effort at modernization begun by Peter the Great which China would do well to imitate. However, it is doubtful whether such attitudes were very widespread. To influential Chinese Russia was merely a slightly less troublesome, less efficient, and less overbearing section of Europe. If Russia's institutional and ideological

heritage had certain similarities with that of China, neither Russians nor Chinese seemed very much aware of the fact.

Nevertheless, as has been suggested, there were such similarities. The communists have talked a good deal about how they mobilized the workers and peasants of the two countries, and about how the bourgeois revolutions against feudal survivals and the proletarian revolutions against growing capitalism and imperialism placed them in power. It is not clear, however, that these assertions, to the trifling extent they may be true in any sense, have anything important to do with the explanation of why the dynasties collapsed or why the forces attached to genuinely reformist solutions failed or why the communists themselves finally succeeded. It has

been argued here that the partial absence in Russia and China of the prerequisites for free states and open societies contributed to the failure of the reformers and the victory of the totalitarians, as the lack of a sophisticated philosophical tradition eased the task of those who sought to win able, dedicated young spirits to the crudities of Marxism-Leninism. No doubt wars, political mistakes, and personal ineptness among the non-communists played important parts, as the abilities, trickeries, and strokes of luck of the communists were significant.

It is doubtful that the communists understand to this day all the factors that led them to win, but unless non-communists come to understand better what happened, their chances of staving off further disasters will be small.

Perspective III

Chinese History

Does China want to shake loose from her present political, military and economic dependence on Russia? We must interpret Chinese motives in the light of China's own historical tradition.

What can we learn from the history of China that might illuminate the problem of the Sino-Soviet relation today and give us some inkling of its future? This question becomes particularly meaningful in view of the seeming abandonment by the Chinese communists of much that has gone into the more recent development of their country. Does not Communist China in truth constitute an immense reversion from the modern world, back toward traditional Chinese ideas and practices in government and international affairs?

China's Dependence

To put this all into proper perspective, it is perhaps necessary to recall some of the fundamentals of modern China. About fifteen years ago I attempted to state some of these in a small book (*China Among the Powers*). I stressed the weaknesses of China, and the unlikelihood of its being able within twenty-five years to provide for its own security on anything like a great-power basis. Hence, I argued, China must remain dependent upon others for at least that long, and perhaps longer.

This general thesis was brought forth at the very moment when China was being officially installed as one of the Big Five of international affairs, and the reaction to it was mixed. But from one significant quarter there came strong endorsement of these views as "realistic" and based upon genuine knowledge of China. This was the reaction expressed in a Russian technical journal—on scientific grounds, as differentiated from the inevitable propagandistic reaction in the *New Times*

of Moscow. Perhaps it is not going too far to say that in 1945 there was a better understanding of China's continuing need for economic and military dependency in the Soviet Union than in any quarter of the West. At the same time the Russians held the natural belief that this dependency would quite probably be upon the West, therefore chiefly upon the United States. Thus Stalin's interest in Manchuria was both a valid feature of his policy for protecting the Chinese communists, and a purely imperialistic interest on his part.

The West had long been pursuing a policy based upon the assumption that China was incapable of defending itself against external aggression. Treaties and other international agreements regarding China clearly embodied this belief. It was hoped by the framers and protagonists of some of these that China's security could be guaranteed by various ordinances of self-denial on the part of would-be aggressors, backed by strict arms limitation. But this whole attempt fell apart after 1931, when by force of arms Japan took over the Manchurian region of China, and the Western Powers failed to prevent the conquest. Eventually this sequence led to World War II, in the course of which we publicly stated that our postwar aims included the restoration of Chinese sovereignty over all lands taken from her, the restoration of her complete self-government and sovereignty, etc.

At the same time, however, we were actually in the process of liquidating our traditional policy toward China. This finally happened at the Yalta Conference, where Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to restore the

DAVID NELSON ROWE

pre-1905 Russian position in the Chinese territories of Manchuria. By this and other acts we effectively abandoned our position in Asia as defenders of Asian nationalism against foreign aggression and colonialism. This Yalta sell-out convinced all thinking Chinese patriots that the West either could not or would not defend the independent states just beginning to develop in Asia. Was the coming thing perhaps communist international universalism?

When in addition we failed to give the Chinese Nationalists any material support in their war against the communists in China, we combined this political sell-out with a military betrayal. General Marshall's ill-fated attempt to bring these two irreconcilable enemies into a framework of constitutional and legal compromise embodied a total mis-reading of the revolutionary environment in China. In its approach the United States actually combined a maximum of political-military pressures against its friends in China with a minimum of pressures against their enemies.

Anti-West Reaction

By these actions, combined with other factors that influenced the outcome in the same direction, we helped throw China into the grip of a thorough reaction against the West and everything it stood for. The internal result was political absolutism. The result in foreign relations was political universalism. The fact that both these modes were communist in the orthodox sense should not distract our attention from the distinct reversion here to earlier Chinese patterns of thought, which the long course of

the modern Chinese revolution had never wholly destroyed.

With the help of the Russians and their friends everywhere, we forced China into this reversionist pattern. This did not just happen; it was by no means inevitable; it was caused.

Traditional Policy

What were the chief features of this traditional Chinese pattern of national and international politics to which the Chinese communists have reverted? It would be impossible to examine all of them here, and since we are chiefly concerned with the relation between Communist China and the Soviet Union, we may limit our analysis to the international features. Here the traditional Chinese pattern is quite clear. Throughout much of Chinese history the relations between China and surrounding regions were those of a central state (China) disseminating her culture abroad and making cultural satellites in a number of areas. China's relations with these regions varied greatly in intensity and type. She usually accompanied the export of her ideology with the institution of a system of military protection in the satellite areas. There was a minimum of interference in local self-government, provided always the governments in the dependencies were friendly and neither combined against China nor sought alliances with her enemies. There were also economic relations between China and her dependencies, but ideological, political and military relations were paramount.

Since in Imperial China politics and government were based on an all-pervasive Confucian ideology, this ideology together with the related social and political psychology was exported from China to the dependencies wherever and whenever possible. This helped provide the basis for genuine harmony of thought between the Chinese ruling elite and the elite of the dependencies. It was hoped that the dependencies would become politically homogeneous with China. The ultimate aim was a universal politics among all "civilized" peoples. All others were "barbarians," beyond the pale, and worthy only of complete subjugation as a preliminary to the introduction of Chinese civilizing influences.

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In the Chinese way of thought this relationship with her dependencies was a mutually honorable and profitable one. The dependent areas grew to accept this view also. The Chinese had an innate tendency to attribute to themselves a general superiority over all non-Chinese. But the ability of the ruling elite over the centuries to make the conditions of dependency upon China "an honorable estate" is indeed a major tribute to their diplomatic skill, as well as to some of the time-honored features of their official ideology itself. In general the Chinese way of treating dependents was marked by a Confucian stress on strongly maintaining the privileges of all persons, differentiated according to their status in society, without the handicap of egalitarianism of a more romantic type.

Reliance on Russia

That China today is in so many respects a dependency of the Soviet Union does no essential violence to these basic historical precedents. The reversal of China's role in this revolution of her status in East Asia does not disturb the logical or practical virtues of the condition of dependency as the Chinese mind understands it. In a way, the current dependence upon the Soviet Union is for the Chinese communist elite the culmination of a search which had been going on in China for decades, and which all the excursions into a Western-type political modernism had never quieted. This was the search for a valid system of dependency, for a source of power which could be relied upon to pay off in the real coin of ideology, dependable military support in any and all exig-

encies, and—in the world of today where China's economy had to be revolutionized—in economic support. Better, it was argued, to be a thoroughgoing dependency of someone who can be relied upon than to run off after the illusory values of Western political modernism, that is, nationalism under a rule of law among equal independent states. This mood, as I observed it in China on the eve of communist takeover (1948), was strong and becoming stronger even in many of the Chinese intellectuals who had been formerly the most convinced and dedicated supporters of the Western way of life.

Aspirations for Empire

History never quite repeats itself, even in reverse. Accordingly, it was also possible for Communist China, as time went on, to enjoy having her own dependencies such as North Korea and North Vietnam. It seems clear that she aims in the future to bring all of Korea and Vietnam into her orbit as satellites, plus all the chief countries and areas of Southeast Asia, and eventually Japan itself, which though in traditional times much influenced by China, was never a part of the system of Chinese dependencies.

The very material need of Communist China for dependency upon the Soviet Union should be evident. It is quite true that her own domestic investment in industrialization, for example, exceeds the amounts received by loan from the Russians. But the Soviet supply of equipment and technicians is the critical part of the total investment. It is indispensable to the whole effort at industrialization. This also holds for the military field. The number of Soviet forces in Communist China is small compared with the masses of Chinese troops, but again, the critical components such as aircraft and other specialized weapons are all, or in vital preponderance, supplied by the Soviet Union. Communist China's entire military posture and her policy of armed aggression in such places as Korea and northern India are possible only because of the mutual overriding commitment between her and the Soviet Union, which gives her a power of international blackmail in spite of her own relatively

mediocre military strength. Was it Communist China which made her own defeat in Korea impossible? Or was it the threat that a defeat of China, quite feasible within the resources of the United Nations, might bring the Russians in and start World War III, that prevented us from winning the Korean War?

Friction with USSR

Much is being made nowadays of the possible ideological divergence between the Chinese and Soviet communists. Even if such divergences should exist, the important question concerns their extent, and their likely impact on the continued cooperation of the two chief communist states. Whatever the disagreements amount to, they do not seem in any way to mean that the Chinese communists have ceased to view China and the rest of the world through Marxist-Leninist dogma. Much greater ideological differences than any which have so far been observed between Communist China and the Soviet Union could develop without in any way changing the basic dogmatic link, or materially harming the continued cooperation of these two countries in the pursuit of the communist world revolution. To argue otherwise would be like trying to prove that because the institutional systems and parliamentary terminologies of the United States and the United Kingdom are so dissimilar, one or the other of them does not genuinely practice a variety of representative government.

Now, it is always possible that quite apart from practical issues or ideological involvements, partners may disagree. In the Sino-Soviet case, one of the most obvious sources of disagreement is the traditional xenophobia of the Chinese. There has undoubtedly been more friction with Russians in Communist China, for example, than their hosts would be likely to admit, or we would easily learn of. But the evidence is that, as in many other countries where foreigners have been focal points of friction, this has never become a major problem. It is clear that the Chinese communists invite, and desperately need in China, the services of their Soviet comrades, and that there are enough of them there to provide the Soviet Union with a

thoroughgoing network of informers on local Chinese conditions. There are no appreciable signs today of such friction between Russians and communist Chinese as would constitute a major difficulty in relations between the two countries for the near future.

On the other hand, there are in China's past history many precedents for shifts in the relations between the central power and its satellites. Let us examine types of shift that have taken place in the past, and try to determine whether these have any chance of being recreated soon in the relations between the USSR and Communist China.

In the past, when Chinese dynasties have declined in vigor and the government of the Empire has weak-



ened, the tendency has arisen for China to seek to escape her responsibilities toward the dependencies. In the nineteenth century, for example, when the Empire was hard pressed by Western and Japanese expansionism and when the ruling dynasty was lacking in the qualities necessary to government, numerous of China's dependencies were penetrated and taken over by third powers. At times when China's internal affairs were in such bad condition that the government could not extend a normal degree of armed protection to its dependencies, these areas tended to fall away, and if other pressures were brought to bear on them at the same time, they often changed their allegiance.

To raise the possibility today that the Soviet Union would be forced by its own internal weaknesses and problems to decline to support its own dependency, Communist China, against the threat of foreign pressure is so far-fetched as to border on the ridiculous. Today, when the Soviet Union feels safe in threatening the United States with rockets if Washington should "intervene" in

Cuba, there is little indication of such a degree of Soviet weakness as would cause it to abandon dependencies much closer and more important than that small Caribbean country.

Furthermore, in the free world we have gone a long way toward accepting the communist doctrine that anything within their "boundaries" is entirely, irrevocably and permanently theirs. At the same time, we seem to feel that almost anything still outside their "boundaries" is a suitable subject for a discussion raising the question as to whether or not it should be "liberated" into a condition more suitable for communist absorption. Thus today, there is neither the weakness within the central power, the Soviet Union, nor the positive resolution within the free world, necessary to create in relation to Soviet satellites anything like the possibility, seen in China's past history, for the detachment of dependencies from their political orbit.

Another precedent in Chinese history involved the gradual increase of strength in dependent areas, with a resulting decrease of the need for dependency upon the central power. As a result, some satellite areas developed in the direction of autonomy or independence. This type of development would coincide at times with the weakening of third power pressures on the dependencies. Here is where Chinese communist foreign policy seems most clearly set against the possible repetition of a pattern of past history. The Chinese elite seems to reason that it is quite possible to regulate the degree and nature of the external hostilities that will be brought to bear, or that can be made to seem a threat whether actually so or not.

It is illuminating to contrast the attitude of the United States government in this respect with that of the Chinese communists. At the same time that Washington presses the Chinese communists to abjure the use of force in the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese communists openly prepare for just such use, thus preserving hostile relations. In this policy they rely upon and thus sustain their military dependency on the Soviet Union, which is the presupposition of their political and economic dependence. They are evidently determined not to

allow a weakening of third power pressures to decrease the need for Russian military involvement in China. How mistaken it is, in this context, to proceed on the assumption that the Chinese aim to extricate themselves from their present dependency on the Soviet Union! Any such assumption is based upon a false reading of Chinese communist motivations in almost every field, as well as upon an irrelevantly Western interpretation of the word, "dependency," as contrasted with the traditional Chinese interpretation.

Still another type of change in the relation between the central Chinese Empire and its dependencies took place at times when the central government disintegrated and a regime in a formerly dependent area took over the whole of China. This happened, for example, in the case of the Mongol takeover of China, beginning in the thirteenth century, and of the Manchu accession to power in the seventeenth century. These cases are not identical, since the Mongols, unlike the Manchus, had been little influenced by Chinese civilization. However, in both cases, the domination of China by what had been a rather unimportant satellite or dependent, was made possible as much by the internal disintegration of central China as by the direct strengthening of the satellite area itself. The Manchus, in particular, could hardly have succeeded in imposing their rule on China except for the internal divisions, rampant factionalism and disorder which invited them to intervene in China's affairs.


This type of precedent would apply to the relation between the Soviet Union and its greatest dependent, Communist China, only if we could point to an internal Soviet decay and disintegration that, unfortunately, are not much in evidence.

Advantages of War

Are the Chinese communists themselves under the delusion that the Soviet Union is on the way down, and that they may find it possible by sufficient effort to reverse the roles of Russia and China? There is much possibility for self-delusion built into the Marxist dogmatism that grips the Chinese communists today, and such

delusion may be more virulent at the top than at the bottom of the official hierarchy. Remarks made by members of the elite to the effect that an atomic war would leave China with one-half (300 million) of its people remaining alive, have served to create the impression in some quarters that the Chinese communists are counting on Russia's being destroyed, together with the United States, in a nuclear war which they themselves would survive.

It is also true that in recent years the Chinese communists have focused strongly on protection against the peculiar and almost unique vulnerabilities of their society in wartime. Their Korean War germ warfare propaganda campaign, for ex-



ample, was certainly planned to forestall Western development and possible use of biological weapons systems, to which Communist China is particularly vulnerable. And their current institution of Peoples' Communes in both rural and urban areas is clearly designed to maximize military, political, social and economic localism in China in case of general war. The Commune structure strengthens the aspect of Chinese society that so frustrated the Japanese in 1937-45, and helped create, in the minds of many military observers in the West, the notion that any and all attacks against the body of China, by no matter whom, are doomed to inevitable failure. The prevalence of this erroneous idea materially handicapped our own strategy in the Korean War, and it is doubtful that we have yet purged our minds of all its stultifying effects.

It must be categorically stated that it would be only in the event of a major war which did not include China as a major theater that the Chinese communists could possibly count on a reversal of their relation to the Russians. If the United States had few weapons to spare from Soviet targets, so that China suffered rela-

tively little damage, perhaps the Chinese communists could hope to pick up the pieces. It is conceivable that some such hope as this helps to account for their continued intransigence toward us, and their emphasis on the "inevitability" of war between "socialism" and "imperialism." These attitudes, in turn, might even work to make such a war — from which they would plan to stand aside until the last stages—more likely.

The West's Answer

If the Russians were convinced that the Chinese communists actually held this outlook, and if the Russians are as convinced as they seem to be that they can bury us without resort to the risk and mutual destruction of nuclear war, then they would have every reason for avoiding the war. It would even make sense for them to want us to have a large enough stockpile of H-bombs to feel we can spare plenty for China after due attention to all Soviet targets. If that were the case, and known to be the case, it would presumably discourage the Chinese communists from trying to provoke the war. In the meantime, any and all Chinese communist ideas along these lines could and should be eliminated once for all by our own adoption of a clearcut strategy for unlimited war which would include Communist China. A healthy step in this direction was revealed by the recent publicized statement that Polaris submarines will soon join the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific.

The dependent relation of the Chinese communists to the Soviet Union is required by the objective situation in which they find themselves. The slight and temporary problems to which this relation has given rise are not enough to threaten its continuance. Moreover, the Chinese communists can feel that in terms of China's own history and tradition their dependence is politically and psychologically acceptable to themselves and to their subjects. So far as they seek guidance from their national history, they have no reason to wish or to expect that their relation of dependence toward the Soviet Union will be either abandoned or reversed in the presently discernible future.

Perspective IV

Communist History

The history of the Comintern offers a neglected clue to Mao Tse-tung's political career and to Chinese Communism's past, present and future.

There is probably no other country where the connection between the Russian October Revolution and the founding of the Communist Party is as striking as in the case of China. In contrast to Europe and to several Asiatic and American nations, China had no socialist party before October, 1917. Whereas elsewhere the Communist Party has generally sprung from the socialist Left, in China it has no root in Marxian, Western socialism.

Everything came from Moscow and everything was presented in the Bolshevik version. In 1920, the Communist Manifesto was translated into Chinese at the same time as the first articles of Lenin; the first emissaries of the Communist International, starting with Gregory Voitinsky and G. Maring, (alias Sneeveliet) visited the country; the Communist Party was founded under strict supervision; the doctrine and the organization were imported from Moscow. Bolshevism was thus transplanted to China even before fertile ground had been found in which it could germinate.

After forming the Chinese Communist Party, the Comintern laid down its tactical line: alliance with the Kuomintang. The objective of this alliance was explained to the Fourth Congress of the Communist International by a Chinese orator in a speech of total frankness:

If we should abstain from penetrating this party [the Kuomintang] we would be isolated in our propaganda for Communism, which would thus remain an abstract principle, powerful and elevated, no doubt, but unable to move the masses. If we penetrate this party we can show the masses that we also defend revolutionary democracy, but that this democracy is for us but a means to attain a

still higher goal. . . . We can thus win the masses to our ideas, and destroy the Kuomintang.¹

That the Comintern, through the intervention of its agents, directed the Chinese Communist Party in this first phase, from 1921 to 1927, is a historic, and notorious, fact. It is only with the rise of Mao Tse-tung that the problems of the actual relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and Moscow provokes debate and diverse interpretations.

Mao-Moscow Relations

To get a clear picture, it is important, at the start, to distinguish three elements which are generally confused in these discussions on the theme, Mao-Moscow. The first is based on the numerous "theoretical essays" of Mao Tse-tung, starting with his "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan," written in February, 1927, which was to become famous in the West, much later, as the first proof of Mao's "heresy." The discussion on this general subject still continues, but it is, fundamentally, more academic than political. Even if one admits that Mao Tse-tung has sometimes diverged in his writings from Leninist doctrines—which is far from proved—this fact would in no way suffice to class him as a "rebel." Lenin made his revolution in the name of Marx, but acted totally at variance with Marx' theories of social revolution; Stalin used Lenin to justify his "building of socialism in a single country"; and Khrushchev, in his turn, has rejected Lenin's theory of the inevitability of wars in an imperialist epoch. All three, while practicing revisionism,

1. *Bulletin of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International*, Moscow, Dec. 2, 1922, No. 20, p. 5.

BRANKO LAZITCH

have cried out incessantly against the "revisionist treason" of others, from Bernstein to Tito. The same is true with the theories of Mao Tse-tung: so long as Mao remains all-powerful, his *Complete Works* will remain among the keystones of Marxism-Leninism. If he falls from power, these same *Complete Works* will serve as proof of his continuous deviations for the past forty years.

The second distinguishable element are the disputes of Mao Tse-tung with the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, disputes which undeniably and fairly frequently occurred after 1926-1927. These conflicts took place within the Central Committee of the Chinese Party, not in or with the Executive Committee of the Comintern. They are part of the history of the Chinese Party, but not of the history of the Party's relations with Moscow.

There remains a third element, the simplest, but also the most decisive in determining the relationship between Mao Tse-tung and the Comintern: and this is based on the official documents of the Comintern's directing body. To be sure, the majority of the documents which bear on Mao's relations with Moscow are accessible to no one, including communist historians, but the rare official statements of the Comintern permit one to establish certain guideposts, once this governing principle of Stalin's policy has been admitted: that while communist leaders have often been first covered with eulogies, and then stigmatized as traitors, it has never happened in the annals of world communism that a leader suspected of "deviationism" and insubordination has been promoted in rank, and praised for his actions. In applying this principle to

Mao Tse-tung, one can say that if Mao had been hostile to the Comintern, the Comintern would never have publicized his merits.

Party Militant

Though he was one of the twelve founders of the Chinese Communist Party—only two of them were still in the Party at the moment of its triumph in 1949—Mao Tse-tung was not a member of the first Central Committee and in the early years was not one of the better-known Party leaders. During this period, his name does not appear in the official publications of the Comintern. Probably for the first time he is referred to—without being named—in connection with the above cited "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan." At the Eighth enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in May 1927, Bucharin, its chairman at that time, referred to point 2 of the agenda, "Problems of the Chinese Revolution." He described this report of "one of our agitators" as "excellent and interesting," and quoted a passage to prove this characterization, without finding any signs of the "deviation" which Western China hands would later uncover.

In the troubled years 1926-28, Mao Tse-tung was in conflict with certain leaders of the Chinese Party, but there is no trace of any criticism he leveled at that time against the Comintern, or, conversely, of criticism of him from Moscow. Over the course of the years, the Comintern had numerous disagreements with the leaders of the Chinese Party, but each time the outcome was the same: these leaders were purged, while Mao Tse-tung remained. Still more striking: ousted from the Central Committee by his own comrades, Mao, despite the fact that he was not present, was reinstated by the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Party which took place in Moscow. The least one can say is that this Congress, meeting at the headquarters of the Comintern, would not have reinstated Mao in the directing body of the Chinese Party if he had been suspected of being a deviationist or a rebel.

When Mao Tse-tung devoted himself to building up partisan bands, the official organ of the Comintern

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never missed an occasion to praise him despite the rather modest extent of these military units. Thus, in 1929: "We learn from official sources that the partisans are well armed and are organized along military lines. The troops of Chu Teh and of Mao Tse-tung number 6,000 men."² The following year the same organ published a curious article. Under the heading, "Our Dead," bordered in black, it announced the death of Mao:

Reports from China tell us of the death of Comrade Mao Tse-tung—one of the co-founders of the Communist Party of China, initiator of the detachments of partisans, founder of the Red Army, and the most feared enemy of the great landowners and the bourgeoisie—is dead on the Fukien front as the result of an old lung ailment.

The article ended thus:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung was the principle political director of the "Chu Teh-Mao Tse-tung" troops. In his region, he fully carried out the resolutions of the Sixth World Congress [of the Communist International] and destroyed the illusions of the reformists. . . . Mao Tse-tung has fulfilled his historic mission as a Bolshevik and a Pioneer of the Chinese Proletariat.³

This premature obituary is full of interest as soon as one takes into consideration the fact that the adage, *De mortuis nihil nisi bonum*, has never been admitted by communist morality, particularly during Stalin's epoch. Death is not an extenuating circumstance for the communists: "traitors" remain traitors and "suspects" remain suspects. If Mao had the right to an obituary notice full

2. *International Press Correspondence ("Inprecorr")*, 13 July 1929.

3. *Inprecorr*, 22 March 1930.

of compliments in the organ of the Comintern, this proves that he was judged faithful to Moscow.

The foundation of the Soviet Chinese Republic in 1931 did not put an end to the internece fights within the leadership of the Chinese Party, but it brought in a new and important element: the name of Mao Tse-tung appeared more and more often in the official writings of the Comintern, usually followed by his title as President of the Soviet government. His appeals, his manifestoes, his political reports are cited in abundance. When the Seventeenth Congress of the Russian Bolshevik Party assembled in January 1934, Manuilsky paid particular honor to the Chinese Communist Party by placing it immediately after the Russian Communists in the Comintern hierarchy: "After the Communist Party of the USSR, the first place



Mao Tse-tung

belongs incontestably to the Chinese Communist Party, whose combative activity has greatly accelerated the ripening of the revolutionary crisis."

At Tsunyi in January, 1935, Mao Tse-tung was named chief of the Chinese Party. The Seventh and last Congress of the Comintern was held seven months later. Until then, Mao Tse-tung had never figured in the directing bodies of the International. This time, although absent, he was made a member of the Executive Committee, a position he held until the official dissolution of the organization in 1943. He was singled out for particular notice by the delegates, as is shown in the report of the final session: "Ercoli [Togliatti] then read, in alphabetic order, the members proposed for election to the directing organs of the Communist

International. . . . Manifestations of approval were evoked at the names of Ercoli, Gottwald, Yezhov, Koplenig, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Mao Tse (the President of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Chinese Republic), Marty, and Pieck. . . ."

The esteem in which Mao was held in Moscow can be explained in two completely contradictory ways. According to the theorists of Mao Tse-tung's "independence" from Moscow, Mao had imposed himself as Party chief, and the Comintern had accepted this as a *fait accompli*. Now this hypothesis not only has no documentary proof, but appears highly improbable in the light of Stalin's mentality, and the political context of the period. Mao Tse-tung could have been elected head of the Chinese Communist Party in 1935 without the direct intervention of the Comintern, but he would not have been able to maintain himself in power without its approval; and this he would not have obtained, had he not been considered faithful to Moscow. In 1935, he was far from strong enough to impose himself as head of the party against Stalin's will. In China, the communist movement was going through an extremely difficult period in the course of the Long March, which obliged Mao's partisans, under constant harassment, to quit central China and take refuge in the north along the border of Mongolia, a satellite country adjacent to the

would have resigned himself to a *fait accompli*. Stalin always preferred to have a foreign Communist Party crushed but docile, rather than strong but independent.

Alliance with Chiang

The second possible explanation is consistent with the general character of Stalinist policy. Mao, having become the head of an important communist movement, continued to follow the line laid down by Stalin, including those abrupt turns in which Stalin specialized. Thus, on June 15, 1935, Mao Tse-tung, along with Chou En-lai and Chu Teh published a manifesto which said:

The Chinese Soviet Government declares that it has condemned Chiang Kai-shek to death. It calls on the people of the entire country to put an end to this watchdog of Japanese imperialism.

But the following year, in 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek was actually arrested by surprise in Sian, instead of being shot he was saved, by the intercession of the Chinese Communist Party in the person of Chou En-lai, one of the signers of the manifesto.

On August 21, 1937, Stalin concluded a non-aggression pact with Chiang Kai-shek; and three weeks later, on September 22, the Chinese Communist Party made public the conclusion of an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek, after ten years of civil war against him. After Stalin signed the non-aggression pact with Hitler's Germany, on August 23, 1939, Mao Tse-tung was one of the first foreign communist leaders to approve it, which he did publicly in the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, just as he approved all the other acts of Stalin that resulted from the pact, such as, for example, the entry of Soviet troops into Poland and Soviet economic aid to Hitler. On April 21, 1941, the Soviet Union attempted a parallel deal with Japan: a non-aggression pact was signed in Moscow, under the terms of which Japan recognized the Republic of Mongolia (a Soviet satellite), and the Soviet Union recognized the government of Manchukuo (a Japanese satellite), both of which were created out of territories belonging to China. Mao Tse-tung aligned himself with

Stalin, once again, as is proved by the directions which he himself penned and sent on May 25 to the members of the Chinese Communist Party. Evidently he did not expect (anymore



Chiang Kai-shek

than did Stalin) that a month later, after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, a new reversal would be called for in military and political alliances; that Stalin would become the ally of the democracies of the West, and that the Chinese Communist Party, once again, would seek a rapprochement with Chiang Kai-shek.

Illusions Fostered

With the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943, the last official link between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party disappeared, a tactical advantage which the communists exploited to the fullest. From this time on, influential circles in the West successively adopted various theses on the problem of the relations between the Soviet Communist Party and Mao, which cancelled themselves out one after another.

The first illusion corresponded with the general state of mind at the end of World War II, and fitted in with the optimistic views about Stalin, the Soviet Union, and a nationalist and democratic evolution of communism. It may be reduced to this affirmation: Mao's movement is not communist, and is altogether divorced from Moscow. This absurdity, with its unlucky historic consequences, was simultaneously spread by the highest communist authorities, such as Stalin and Molotov, and by some of the American reporters in China, who



Stalin

Soviet Union. In addition, in 1935-36 Stalin had begun to liquidate entire teams of Comintern leaders. This makes it difficult to see how Stalin

were more or less under the influence of the communists, if not in their service. Today it is not even worth refuting. But at that time, when Stalin and Molotov were propounding these clumsy lies for the benefit of Averell Harriman, Patrick Hurley and Harry Hopkins, all of them special envoys of Roosevelt and Truman, this grotesque assertion had a major influence on Western policy toward China. This was the time when Stalin could remark to Harriman (July 10, 1944): "The Chinese communists are not real communists. They are 'margarine' communists." In order to realize how brazenly Stalin was pulling Harriman's leg, we need only recall that the three principal Chinese "margarine" Communists—Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Chu Teh—were members of the Executive Committee of the Comintern along with Stalin himself, until its dissolution. The following year (1945) the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party elected a Central Committee, 57 per cent of whose members had received their training in Soviet political and military schools — a percentage which probably no other non-Russian Communist Party could equal.

Western Optimism

Mao Tse-tung having installed a communist regime in China from the moment of his victory, this theory had to be abandoned and replaced by another. From 1949 on, "Chinese Titoism" became the leitmotif of political commentaries and prognostications. This coincided neatly with illusions about the contagious nature of Tito's example. Whereas Americans had priority on the preceding illusion, this time the British led the way. The identification of Mao with Tito continued until 1954-1955, as witness the remark of Clement Attlee upon his return from China in the summer of 1954:

It may, of course, be said that these are early days and that the Chinese Party will in due time introduce full-blown communism, but it will certainly be a difficult task. . . . I think that their actual policy is likely to be more inflexible than their theories. I have the impression that the Chinese communists have more genuine idealists in their ranks than have the Russians. . . . Mao Tse-tung and Chou

En-lai are revolutionaries in their own right and, like Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, strong characters.

Once more, events have taken exactly the opposite direction. Mao Tse-tung has placed himself in the vanguard of the struggle against "Titoist treachery," and no one dares, nowadays, to associate these two names.

The next illusion, which attained its apogee in 1956, during the de-Stalinization campaign which followed the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, credited



Mao with the initiative in this operation, thus making him the principal "liberal" and "anti-Stalinist" communist leader. But once again, the future was to give the lie to these gratuitous assumptions. Mao Tse-tung, from one day to the next, became the leading "hard," "anti-liberal," and "Stalinist"—a position to which he still belongs, today. This was the latest upset in this series of hypotheses manufactured in the West.

During 1960, sensational reports on the conflict between Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev have increased and multiplied at an extraordinary pace. In April, on the occasion of Lenin's anniversary; in May, in connection with the failure of the Summit Conference; in June, during the conference of communist leaders at Bucharest, etc.—and there is no reason why they should not continue during the months and years to come.

Rather than wandering further in this miasma of rumor and counter-rumor, it may be more useful to formulate a few final observations on the nature of the relations between Moscow and Peking.

First, systematic misinformation originated by the communists themselves, coupled with the exaggera-

tion of unverified and unimportant facts by Western commentators, has so often played a major role in the formation of faulty judgments on this problem that it would seem to be a matter of elementary prudence to refuse to accept at face value every new version of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Second, the monolithic facade and the absence of any genuine discussion within the "socialist family"—traits characteristic of the Stalin period—have noticeably changed since then, particularly since 1956. Since that time it has become evident that the reactions of the "fraternal parties" on important points are no longer rigorously unanimous: the French Party does not take exactly the same position as the Italian Party; the governments of eastern Europe do not speak an exactly identical language. Now, this situation has not resulted in conflict between the various communist parties, nor in the elimination of spokesmen for somewhat discordant policies. Consequently, it is possible for the Chinese point of view on certain problems, to be, for a variety of reasons, somewhat different from Moscow's.

Third, these differences of opinion remain within the "socialist family" so long as neither of the partners has any intention of breaking the unity of the communist bloc. What stands out today (as it did yesterday) in the statements of the Chinese is their insistence on the absolute necessity of maintaining the unity of the communist bloc. That problems will arise which will cause divergence within the bloc has been evident since the Communist International first saw the light of day. That one group or another should invoke the authority of Lenin, strongly buttressed with appropriate quotations and citations, in order to give an ideological and doctrinal character to these potential conflicts, is perfectly in keeping with the communist code. But when such disagreements and friction arise between two of the Parties (or, more precisely, between their two governing bodies), as is neither improbable or new, they are settled in the greatest secrecy. The conflict is not made public. When no solution can be found in a particular case, and the matter is made public, usually under

the form of ideological criticism, this means that a decision has been made to liquidate the target of the criticism. If a tenth of the polemics of Peking against Khrushchev, and of Moscow against Mao Tse-tung, as presented by the Western press, were really so, the rupture between China and Russia would already be an accomplished and public fact.

Peking-Moscow Solidarity

Although the West has decided that it cannot or will not act inside the communist bloc, it must recognize, at the very least, its urgent need to understand what is going on there, and what is being prepared. It is not impossible that in the future Mao Tse-tung may claim for himself and his party a double honor: the governing role, now held exclusively by Russia, and the role of oracle of the Marxist-Leninist credo, now usurped by Khrushchev. It is possible that one day the Chinese, after having publicized Lenin's pronouncements

on the inevitability of war, may disinter another quotation, long passed over in silence, although its relevance is more and more evident: "For a time—undoubtedly very brief—hegemony in the revolutionary proletarian International has passed to the Russians, just as in different periods of the nineteenth century it belonged to the English, then the French, then to the Germans," wrote Lenin on May 1, 1919, in the first issue of *The Communist International*. This "very brief" period has lasted forty years. The Chinese can today put forward their candidacy, if not for hegemony, at least for parity with the Russians, a proposal which will not fail to evoke repercussions within the communist bloc. Nevertheless, even assuming this hypothesis, the solidarity of the two communist powers, which unites them in their struggle for the conquest of the world, will remain stronger than their internal disagreements.

At present, it is pure utopianism to expect to exploit possible contradic-

tions between Moscow and Peking for the benefit of the West. To take it as an axiom, as is so often done today, that the Chinese are the most menacing of all the communists and that Moscow opposes Chinese extremism, boils down to saying that Khrushchev must be considered a possible ally. In other words, instead of exploiting existing differences between Moscow and Peking, it would be a matter of paying the price for separating the Soviet Union from China and bringing it closer to the West! After making largely useless concessions to Stalin when it was necessary to fight a real fascist threat, the West is supposed to follow a similar policy once more in order to obtain fictitious solidarity with Moscow against "the yellow peril." One need not be a prophet to foresee that this policy would lead the West into further retreats—on Berlin, strategic bases, military and diplomatic alliances, etc.—without in the least provoking, in return, a break between Moscow and Peking.

Strategy

For the next ten to twenty years China will lack sufficient material and scientific resources to pursue a grand strategy independent of Moscow.

STEFAN T. POSSONY

Recently the myth has gained currency that Communist China has a strategy—and even a world strategy—of her own. This strategy supposedly tops that of the Soviet Union in singleness of purpose, ambition, recklessness, skill and bellicosity.

Strategic concepts are not born *in vacuo*. Like other ideas, strategic notions can be transplanted in time and space. Just as arithmetical plus and minus signs can accommodate any number of calculations, so military concepts are applicable to diverse situations. For example, the German war plan of 1914 emulated Hannibal's concept of double encirclement, through which he won the battle of Cannae in 216 B.C. The French general staff was aware of this well-advertised German preoccupation, but this knowledge helped them little when they tried to parry the German assault.

Mao Tse-tung is quite capable of formulating vast operational concepts. He absorbed Bolshevik operational thinking from the period when it centered upon uprising and civil war. He added his own ideas on guerrilla warfare and protracted conflict, which reflected the experiences of the war with Japan and the Chinese revolution. Whether he proved himself a first class strategist in Korea is more debatable, and he has yet to give evidence that he really understands the problems of modern weaponry.

At any rate, strategy in the real world and abstract strategic concepts should not be confused. Although Peking may be rich in concepts, the current capabilities of the Chinese communists are extremely poor. Precisely because there is much propaganda about the growing power of China and the quality of Peking's conflict management, it is important

to go beyond Mao's literature and analyze military realities.

Clearly, China does not possess any of the capabilities requisite for world conquest. Perhaps China has a current global strategy in the sense that its leaders have an image of how to defeat the United States in the future; and in the further sense that they are working toward achieving the capabilities needed to implement their dreams. But in terms of present challenges and conflicts China can do little more than run interference.

China's Backward Technology

When it is said that the strategy of the Chinese communists differs from that of the Moscow communists, such a statement—if it refers to a "national" rather than to an over-all communist strategy—is true. It cannot possibly be false. China stands at a different level of socio-technological development, and its military problems differ enormously from those confronting the Soviet Union. Consequently, Peking's concrete operational planning must follow a logic unlike that prevailing at Moscow. The Kremlin is concerned with cryogenics and cybernetics, spacecraft and nuclear submarines, missiles and anti-missiles. But since Chinese technology and industrial production are out of date by at least fifty years, Peking still must deal with rifles, junks and coolie logistics. The few jets and the heavy artillery which the Chinese possess are of Russian (or American) make; and they have little strategic significance.

Mao may be more strongly convinced than the Kremlin that war is the decisive instrument of revolution. But from their own resources the Chinese cannot acquire nuclear

weapons, nor build, maintain and operate global range delivery systems. Even by 1967-1970, when they "plan" to overtake Britain's industrial output of 1957, they will be unable to produce and run modern weapons systems.

Obviously, China can procure some modern weapons from the Soviet Union and other foreign sources. Given technical aid and resources, they may build and perhaps operate prototypes of one or the other modern weapon. Yet they would remain unable to produce complicated weapons systems, let alone man them with Chinese troops.

Naturally, the question is whether the Soviets have modern weapons to spare, and if so, whether they would transmit them to the Chinese. During the 1950s, the Soviets supplied the Chinese with obsolescent equipment, and failed to equip them plentifully. According to Paweł Monat, former Polish Military Attaché to North Korea, the jet fighters used during the Korean War were flown by Russian pilots. One motivation of Peking's 1958 attack on the offshore islands (Quemoy, Matsu) may have been to compel the Soviets to step up military deliveries. The Chinese may again be tempted to provoke local crises in order to enhance their armament programs. But Moscow will hardly supply intermediate or intercontinental-range missiles, heavy bombers and supersonic jets except, perhaps, in token quantities.

It is feasible, however, for the Soviets to help the Chinese set up modern armaments industries. Once factories have been built and native personnel has been trained, the Chinese probably can continue operating these installations. Still, it is unlikely that the Chinese would get substan-

tial or high quality output. Furthermore, since in the technological era equipment must be constantly modernized, the maintenance of a Soviet-installed Chinese industrial capability is dependent on continued Russian assistance. Thus, an industrial or an armaments facade would mean not lesser but *heavier* reliance on the Soviet Union; granted that semi-modern weapons, even if they have no logistical depth for backup and replacement, would provide military advantages in short campaigns.

Nuclear Weapons from Russia

Thus, if within the next few years the Chinese should set off nuclear devices or acquire nuclear bombs, they will either have obtained them directly from the Soviet Union or from facilities within China which were built and operated under Russian supervision. It is unlikely that such weapons could be tested and serviced by Chinese personnel. On the contrary, it is almost a foregone conclusion that testing, training, maintenance and nuclear operations, for many years to come, would remain, almost exclusively, in Russian hands. The improbable can happen, of course, and the Chinese might succeed in building a few bombs themselves; but they cannot achieve nuclear output of such significance that it would weigh in the strategic balance of the *global* conflict. We should never forget that there are enormous differences between the types of nuclear weapons, and their qualities. A Hiroshima-type capability cannot be compared with Soviet or United States nuclear capabilities as they exist now, and will exist throughout the sixties. However, the Chinese might achieve a nuclear posture—explosives and short-range delivery means—which would enhance their local power within Asia.

Although the communists probably are envisaging various ploys for psychological purposes, ploys do not change the basic equations of power. The geographic transfer of substantial military power is not feasible. If the Chinese, through Soviet grants or through their own means, acquire a limited number of nuclear weapons in the kiloton range, Asian nations may be intimidated, and Africans, Latin Americans, Europeans and

even Americans may be impressed. But in so far as the global conflict is concerned, a nuclear capability of limited size, tied to short-range and obsolescent delivery and support systems, makes no appreciable difference.

In the next decade, China undoubtedly will become a "nuclear power," but only in the sense that Russian technicians supervise a few highly selected Chinese troops in operating atomic weapons in and from China. There may be a great deal of doubt whether an apparent Chinese nuclear capability would not be, in reality, a Russian capability over which Moscow, by direct and indirect means, exercises full control. The apprehension—assiduously propagated in the United States and exploited by test ban agitators—that China soon may join the "nuclear club" is not unjustified in the sense that China must be expected, sooner or later, to demonstrate some sort of a genuine or implanted nuclear capability. But this does not transform China into a major nuclear power; and it will prove more difficult to acquire effective offensive and defensive combat systems than to obtain a few nuclear bombs. Militarily primitive nations often acquire seemingly modern weapons systems; and in a fashion they are able to use them. But the true technological status of a military force is determined by sociological and over-all industrial factors which cannot be changed overnight. To put it in a nutshell: the fundamental weakness of China's military position in the *global* power struggle is, and remains, that the Chinese cannot at-

tack the United States, even if they have a few nuclear weapons, but that the United States could devastate China.

The Manpower Myth

Population pressure is another determinant of China's strategic position. Usually, manpower is considered a strategic asset, but China is weak precisely because it is overpopulated. Crude manpower figures do not indicate the numbers a country can use for war purposes. Among other things, militarily effective manpower depends upon the ratio between farm and industrial labor. It takes less than one American farmer to feed ten Americans and four Russian farmers to feed ten Russians; but it takes eight to nine Chinese peasants to keep alive ten Chinese. Hence the United States has an effective population base of about 160 million, the Soviet Union of 125 million, and China of somewhere between 60 and 120 million. In terms of number and proficiency of skilled labor, China suffers from additional and obvious handicaps.

Population growth has serious strategic implications. It neutralizes a large portion of China's industrial gains. Moreover, the "new people" must be fed. This requires the cultivation of marginal land "reserves," substantial increases in fertilizer output, and considerable improvements in transportation. Yet China produces little investment capital. The other communist-bloc countries, if they are to attain their own economic objectives, must invest most of their capital at home. Hence the Chinese definitely are a *Volk ohne Raum*.

The Soviet Union is already over-expanded. Its food problems cannot be solved by further expansion. But the Chinese government, even if it prefers the colonization of the inner border lands, may want to move into the rice-producing areas of Southeast Asia. In case of famine, local aggression may, of course, be a useful diversion. Conversely, should guerrilla war occur in areas which the Chinese include among their goals, expansionist intervention would be a tempting course of action.

Three additional factors favor expansion. *First*, the continued existence of a nationalist China under-

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mines communist legitimacy claims and prevents the final consolidation of the communist regime. Consequently, the Chinese communists are anxious to destroy the nationalist government on Formosa. Presumably they also are eager to seize Hongkong.

Second, several million "overseas" Chinese are living in the areas surrounding the mainland. Their orientations, interests, and activities, whether pro- or anti-communist, cannot fail but be a motivating force in Chinese strategy.

Third, the Chinese always have maintained their historical claims on various "peripheral" areas. Even if they no longer worry about ancient suzerainties, the communist ideology offers ample justification for expansion in any direction.

Actually, in Burma, Indonesia and the Indo-Chinese successor states, guerrilla conflict has become endemic. If they avoid major battles, the Chinese communists could intervene without running the risk of international complications. This situation is entirely different from that confronting Moscow, which cannot move outside the bloc without provoking limited or large-scale war, and which, to preserve the momentum of its course of empire—in Africa for example—must hide behind national liberation movements.

Conquest in Asia

Chinese capabilities are a function of accessibility. If there were no alliances and international security commitments, the Chinese communists probably could penetrate deeply into Southeast Asia. It may be arguable how many troops could advance how far. But assuming that the Chinese would reach Singapore and be able to consolidate their conquests, they might pass by means of junk invasions into Sumatra and perhaps Java—on the condition, of course, that modern sea and air forces would not intervene and that the local forces would not oppose the invader effectively—e.g., by defensive guerrilla operations. Whether even under optimal conditions the Chinese could leapfrog through all Indonesia is doubtful. It seems rather evident that the Philippines would be beyond the range of current Chinese technology.

In terms of mere accessibility, the Chinese communists could penetrate into South Korea, but they could not seize Japan. Similarly, the Chinese have proved that they can reach the northern borders of India, but given effective Indian-Pakistani defense cooperation, the conquest of that sub-continent would seem to lie beyond the present capabilities of China.

Formosa is China's highest priority objective. Assuming that the island is defended effectively, it would be even more difficult for the communists to invade Formosa in junks than it was for the Nazis to conquer Britain. Before writing off Chinese military capabilities too fast, however, we would do well to remember that the Soviet Union could give the Chinese equipment for amphibious and airborne landings, as well as aircraft suitable for gaining local air superiority.

Everywhere Chinese and communist expansion could be facilitated by



political and psychological pressures, local uprisings and guerrilla harassment, and nuclear demonstrations. On the other hand, the military strength in many target countries has been rising, and internal security has been improved. There are a number of highly vulnerable neutralist no-man's lands, but open Chinese intervention in most areas would activate security pacts, such as SEATO and Commonwealth commitments. An attack, under whatever pretext, on Japan, the Philippines, India, Indonesia or even Formosa would bring about a major conflict which the Chinese could not risk without a Moscow promise to keep

them supplied and, if necessary, to come to their aid.

Assuming that after initial demonstrations they acquire an operational nuclear stockpile within reasonable time, it is improbable that if the Chinese were to use nuclear capabilities in local involvements, they could use such weapons against Asian nations without provoking full-fledged American nuclear retaliation.

Soviet Goals

Let us, therefore, think about the Kremlin's problem. Suppose Moscow has decided that sooner or later it must knock out the United States. Evidently this goal can be achieved only by winning the technological arms race to such an extent that American surrender can be forced through nuclear blackmail or that total nuclear war can be waged without totally destructive retaliation.

In order to achieve a winning posture, the Soviet Union must put a maximum of resources into its own technological programs. It can afford to give China discarded equipment, but it must avoid side shows which would delay preparations for the main event, and which could bring about premature involvement with the United States. Moreover, it must induce the United States to embark ever more vigorously on the road to unilateral disarmament.

If the really decisive contest takes place in the long-range nuclear weapons arena, world conquest by the salami technique through the deliberate waging of limited wars is impractical. Limited wars may occur "spontaneously," and "peripheral" or local victories may offer substantial psychological and political advantages. But nuclear war before the Soviet Union is ready would jeopardize the world revolution.

If, by contrast, the Soviet Union favors a strategy of piecemeal conquest, its overriding requirement still would be to achieve a nuclear deterrent strength so clearly superior that limited wars can be dependably kept "within bounds." Thus, under this hypothesis, too, the Soviet Union must act as though the achievement of a broad capability to defeat the United States by nuclear means is its primary strategy. Since Soviet "margins of nuclear safety"

still are too narrow for the assumption of major risks, Moscow must delay enactment of offensive operations, whether limited or unlimited, until it can handle the United States. In brief, the Soviet strategic position of 1960 requires "coexistence" now.

If the Chinese communists really hold that the revolution must be carried on through incessant struggle, and that respites should not be tolerated, there might be cause for dispute. Actually, Chinese involvements in guerrilla wars throughout the "safe" areas of South and Southeast Asia, and on some islands in the western Pacific, can be called off under almost all conceivable circumstances. Those types of offensive actions *sans* risk therefore might be helpful to the Kremlin's long-range plans as well as to China's immediate interests. If the Chinese were to use nuclear weapons in these guerrilla war areas, the Kremlin probably would not take the risk of sanctioning the operation.

Need for Strategic Alliance

How then can there be a cleavage between the strategies of Communist Russia and Communist China? The Soviet Union has no choice whatever but to prepare for decisive nuclear conflict. Whether or not it communicates its strategic concept for the defeat of the United States to Peking, the Chinese communists, who lack even rudimentary knowledge about the technical problems involved, may fail to comprehend the Kremlin's nuclear strategy.

Lack of comprehension could induce the Chinese communists to exaggerate the significance of the "incessant struggle" in local theaters, to overrate the readiness of the Soviet Union, and to underrate the requirements, difficulties and hazards of nuclear world conquest. They might misconstrue the Kremlin's strategy as an attempt to slow down the revolution and seek accommodation with the West. This is an unlikely interpretation, however. The Chinese communists never misunderstood the need for "gaining time," and they have publicly "approved" coexistence tactics. Ever on guard against "adventurism," any communist knows it is foolish to take enormous chances for strategically unnecessary gains.

But suppose there is a dispute between Moscow and Peking, what can Peking do? The suggestion often has been made that the Chinese communists possess one real weapon which they could employ against Moscow: their ability to provoke a war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a war would bring about the mutual extermination of the two "superpowers." As a result, although as many as 300 million Chinese might be killed in the process, a surviving Red China would become the ruler of the world.

Did Mao Tse-tung make the celebrated remark that in the interest of the world revolution China would be willing to lose 300 million people? Not unexpectedly, such a statement does not appear in Mao's published writings. But since his alleged hecatomb willingness is used as psychological weapon against the Free World, we might inquire into the practicality of victory-through-self-immolation.

It is one thing to argue that China would be stronger if it had only half of its population. It is something entirely different to say that half of the population could be killed and thereafter the Chinese government would still stay in power and retain enough strength to "take over" the world.

A loss of 300 million Chinese could occur in two different ways:

1. A mutually annihilative Russo-American war at excessively high megaton levels could produce fallout which, by drifting into China, would halve the population. This theory implicitly assumes that as fallout kills people, it exhausts itself like bullets which kill only once. Yet fallout could kill again and again. Hence if China were "invaded" by high-powered radioactivity, there is just as good a chance that the entire Chinese population rather than only half would perish.

Actually, in an isolated Russo-American war during the sixties, fallout would remain limited. Consequently, if China remains a non-belligerent, fewer casualties would occur; but to the extent that fallout spreads, China would suffer a disproportionately high loss.

But the point is this: neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would be destroyed. If the Soviet Union wins, communist victory would

be achieved under Moscow's aegis. But the Soviet Union would not have been pushed into attack before it was ready. Hence the United States must be provoked. But if war occurs at a moment when the United States has superior strength, China's dream of a communist world would also be ended, by American victory.

2. Since *ex hypothesi* the Russo-American war would be brought about by Chinese provocation, it is hard to visualize how China could stay out of the fray. If China became a belligerent, it would suffer not only from the fallout drifting in from the outside, but also would be on the receiving end of nuclear explosions. In fact, China's best chance to provoke a war would be to use nuclear weapons if those should be in its possession; but the use of such implements of war almost inevitably would lead to devastating attacks against targets on the Chinese mainland. Thus, possession of nuclear weapons would constitute a merely nominal increase in Chinese capabilities. Despite the probable psychological effect of the new strength, China's freedom of action nevertheless might prove to be more constrained than it was before. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Chinese during the sixties would be before China's time, so to speak. Hence, while it would be a victory in terms of achievement, in a strategic context it would be a Pyrrhic victory.

China's Vulnerability

With its lack of modern equipment, medical facilities, and civil defense capabilities, its inexperience with radioactivity and its overcrowded cities, China is, of all countries, the most vulnerable to nuclear attack. Losses would be particularly severe among the "leading strata" of the Chinese people. Irrespective of whether the communist regime would survive politically, and irrespective of the damage suffered by the industrial nations, once the Chinese population has been decimated, Peking's capabilities for world conquest would be set back by many generations.

The effects of a global nuclear war are hard to predict. Consequently, it is possible that events would develop more favorably for the Chinese communists. But the ultimate outcome is

far too uncertain for them to risk a strategy of this suicidal type. The overwhelming probability is that a defenseless country like China cannot but suffer the most severe and lasting damage of all belligerents. In addition, of course, it is silly to assume that the Moscow communists would allow Peking to trigger off nuclear war at a moment of irresponsible Chinese choosing. It is even more absurd to suppose that the Peking Politbureau would deliberately engineer the destruction of their operational base. Still, this phantasmagoria has been used to induce Free World public opinion into believing that the Chinese communists can effectively impose their law on the rest of mankind.

In fact, the shoe probably is on the other foot. For example, if the Moscow communists wanted to start a global war, one of their more rational courses of action might be to provoke a conflict between the United States and China in order to compel the American forces to expend a large portion of their nuclear stockpile on China. The bombs dropped on Chinese targets obviously could not again be used against the Soviet Union, and fallout usually spreads in an easterly direction. If it should turn out that the Soviet Union has helped the Chinese acquire a nuclear capability, even of token size, the chances are that the Kremlin's apparent helpfulness was prompted by a stratagem of this sort.

Dispute re Formosa

The practical meaning is that, at this juncture, the Chinese communists are able to support, or wage on their own account, guerrilla operations in some areas of Southeast Asia. They also have a moderate capability of intervening in some of the West Pacific islands. Since few risks are involved, there is no reason why the Moscow communists should object to such courses of action. But the Kremlin cannot yet condone really ambitious military attacks.

Peking's political need to liquidate the national regime on Formosa,



however, poses a dilemma. If the communists were to attack Formosa, they would chance a major conflagration. They cannot sustain a large-scale amphibious operation without Moscow's backing and massive support. In the absence of amphibious capabilities, the Chinese might want to use nuclear weapons or at least threaten their use. The Kremlin would be willing to underwrite such an undertaking only if it wants to bring about large-scale conflict, or if the defensive capacities of the nationalists have evaporated—in which case a massive military assault would no longer be necessary.

The Chinese have an overriding interest in obtaining ever-growing support for their own armament and industrialization programs. Whenever Moscow slows down its support, the Chinese communists, by launching provocative actions along their periphery, can put pressure on the Soviet Union. But China is only one of many claimants on Russia's resources. Its needs are so enormous that the largest possible aid can be no more than a drop in the bucket. Hence it is not certain that such tactics would pay. But since it is never certain whether a Chinese probe has Moscow's blessing, attacks on neuralgic points may result in unnecessary Free World concessions. By the same token, strong resistance would severely limit the residual freedom of action presently possessed by Peking.

Thus, if there is really a strategic dispute between Peking and Moscow, it probably centers around Formosa. Presumably, Peking wants to proceed forcefully and speedily against the

Kuomintang, while Moscow considers this task to be less urgent. But, most assuredly, the dispute does not signify that Peking wants to fight a nuclear world war while Moscow desires forever to "coexist peacefully."

Ever since the Chinese showing in Korea ten years ago, the Free World has been overrating China's military power. There is a widespread conviction that China never can be conquered. True, China is relatively safe from World War II type surface invasions. But if the Chinese communists were pitted against modern forces using air power and nuclear munitions, their defensive strength would crumble rapidly, especially if the regime should prove to be unpopular.

The impression that China is on the verge of becoming a first-rate military power is entirely unwarranted. Actually, because of technology, China's military power has been *declining* relatively to that of the Soviet Union and the United States. If technology continues to advance at the rate of the past decade, the Chinese probably will be falling further behind. We must, indeed, expect that sooner or later China will acquire modern weapons. We also must recognize that in terms of past history, Chinese military strength is gradually growing. But in terms of genuine strategic capacities, China is nothing but a Russian satellite. It will remain such for at least ten to twenty years. This will remain true even if the Chinese should acquire a rudimentary nuclear capability during the sixties. But what will be the political world constellation of 1980?

Meanwhile, communist world strategy continues to be made in Moscow. The Chinese, whether they like it or not, are obliged to execute orders issued from the Kremlin. Psychology is used to conceal the true relationship of forces between Moscow and Peking. Bluff and bluster serve to create the deception that China has become an invincible world power. The hoax works, because the United States, like the childlike giant of mythology, remains unaware of its own overpowering strength.

Demography

It is true that Mao is not a Moscow puppet. It is false that Mao "will desert the bandwagon of an historically unavoidable global victory."

What exactly is Communist China's relation to Moscow? This question was asked as soon as the victory of the Chinese communists over Chiang Kai-shek was assured. By the summer of 1949 the Red Army had occupied most of the Chinese mainland. Our State Department responded to the changing situation by issuing in early August a "White Paper" on United States-Chinese relations that replaced a faulty early appraisal of the Chinese communists by one equally problematic.

To be sure, neither at the close of the war nor in the years following did the State Department officially call the Chinese communists "agrarian reformers." But not a few of its consultants took this line, and Washington's insistence on a coalition government with the communists at the time of the Marshall Mission implies that the Chinese communists were then considered different from, and more democratic than, the communists in Eastern Europe where we were opposing any similar arrangement.

This unfortunate position is well documented in the body of the White Paper. The accompanying Letter of Transmittal, however, reveals a change in attitude. For there the Chinese communists are held to be instruments of a "foreign domination," bent on exploiting China "in the interest of a foreign imperialism"—Soviet Russian imperialism.

This description of Moscow's role fitted the communists in Eastern Europe, but not the Chinese communists. The regime that emerged on the Chinese mainland was not a satellite of the Soviet Union. Its leaders were not Soviet satraps, but partners—junior partners—in a gigantic international communist axis. I pointed to this relationship in a

memorandum, "Objectives and Methods of America's Policy in Asia after China's Shift into the Communist Orbit," written, like a number of others, at the request of the State Department in the summer of 1949 to serve as work papers for a conference on the Far East. (The conference, which was held in October of that year, was dominated by a group that vigorously urged the recognition of Red China.) Since in recent years the axis concept has been widely accepted, I cite below the way in which I formulated it in my 1949 memorandum.

In contrast to Eastern Europe, communist power in China did not owe its success to the Russian army, except for clandestine help in the extreme north and northeast. To be sure, the extent of Russian political and military guidance was—and is—probably far greater than we know. But the rise of the Chinese communist government was due essentially to the Chinese Red Armies. Thus, those who try to find Tito-like features in Communist China overlook the fact that Mao Tsetung and his followers emerged as victors not under the direct military and political control of the Soviet apparatus, but as a strongly indigenous movement. *The Peoples Republic of China comes into being as an ally rather than as a satellite of the USSR.* The two gigantic units are not bound together as is the metropolis of an empire and its border satrapies, but like two poles of an axis, Russia being the senior partner and China the junior partner.

The axis concept will be of little analytic help to those who doubt the very existence of serious tensions between Moscow and Peking, because, as they see it, the shared interests are so overriding that any such contingencies are automatically ruled out. Persons who hold to this view overlook the fact that the two major totalitarian movements of our time,

KARL A. WITFOGEL

fascism and communism, have both been harried by countless disagreements, intrigues, deviations, and rectifications. There can be no doubt regarding the community of interest within the communist camp. But we should reject the over-simplified monolithic conclusion that prevents us from paying proper attention to the many conflicts within and between the various communist regimes.

Nature of Disagreement

In trying to determine the nature and degree of the tension between the Soviet Union and Communist China, we must not forget that these states are poles of an axis. This situation gives the junior partner much greater freedom than a satellite to register its own opinions and implement its own policies, but it does not preclude joint action in essential matters. Hitler and Mussolini differed frequently, but they combined forces in the armed struggle against the non-fascist world, and they did so in spite of the fact their doctrinal and institutional ties were not as strong as those that bind the Communist axis partners to one another. Moreover, patterns of conflict vary according to the institutional framework in which they occur. When approaching the actual and potential tensions between Moscow and Peking, we must recognize that we are dealing with peculiar institutional and historical constellations—namely, the Chinese and Russian versions of communist totalitarianism.

Among the numerous attempts to explain these tensions in terms of China's growing population pressure, without reference to this peculiarity, we may consider two that have received wide currency: the first, by the

German doctor, Wilhelm Starlinger; the second, by the American journalist, Harrison E. Salisbury.

Dr. Starlinger, who died in 1956, viewed history as a biological phenomenon. After five years in Soviet captivity (1948-1953) he returned to Germany convinced that, communist ideology notwithstanding, biological (population) pressure would compel Mao's regime to move into Mongolia, the Amur regions, and Siberia, "peacefully if Russia yields . . . or, if Russia remains firm, sooner or later in combat—in the ultimate contest of blood for soil (*in der letzten Auseinandersetzung des Blutes um des Bodens willen*)."¹ Despite the unsavory "blood and soil" formula, Starlinger's ideas have aroused considerable interest in West Germany, and have spread to other sections of Western Europe, especially France.

Starlinger's qualifications to judge these matters were modest in the extreme. His knowledge of the Soviet



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Union derived from his experiences in Russian slave labor camps. His judgments concerning Sino-Soviet relations reflected the speculations of certain of his fellow-inmates and his own geo-biological approach to history. It may be added that his ideas took shape before the collectivization of Chinese agriculture—that is, before a specifically communist development that profoundly affected China's demographic situation.

Unlike Dr. Starlinger, Mr. Salisbury had ample opportunity to study the operational and doctrinal peculiarities of Russian communism. With respect to Communist China, he could have read the comprehensive translations of the Chinese communist press prepared by the United States Consulate General in Hong Kong. These translations cover metropolitan publications as well as regional newspapers that are not available to the general public or to foreign residents in Peking. A passage in Salisbury's recent book indicates that he has not

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taken the trouble to consult this singularly important source of information which is used by all serious students of Communist China, including correspondents who spend much of their time in Mao's capital city.

Salisbury lists several factors as responsible for the "deep and ugly rifts" between Moscow and Peking, but he is most insistent about the threat posed by China's population pressing into the vacant lands of the Soviet Union. General comments on population growth are methodologically problematic in any case; they are worse than meaningless when they pertain to a communist country such as China after the collectivization of agriculture.

Collectives' Low Yield

In Soviet Russia collectivization greatly reduced the incentives and the efficiency of farm labor, despite the extensive character of Russian cultivation. The crippling of incentives through collectivization had a much more devastating effect in mainland China, whose irrigation-based intensive agriculture requires a maximum of personal interest and care.

Since the collectivization (1954-55), the Chinese press has been voicing the regime's grave concern about the low efficiency of farm labor—in some cases only one-half the required quota was attained—and about the resulting labor shortage.² Thus the collectivized villages did not have too many,

but too few, able-bodied persons at their disposal. It was this situation that led to the dispatching of soldiers, students, school children and urban workers to the fields—a fact to which Salisbury points without seeing its implications. And it was this situation that in 1958 led to the initiation of the commune policy, which, by wiping out private plots and shifting hundreds of millions of women from domestic work to farm work, tried to combat the rural labor shortage and at the same time to provide manpower for the new local industries.

This policy went hand in hand with attempts to solve the food problem brought on by the collectivization. Food has been rationed since the winter of 1953-4, and in recent years the population has been fed less grain and more sweet potatoes ("pigs' fodder," as the people call it). But while the regime could ram more sweet potatoes down the people's throats, it was far less successful with its other innovations. The profound crisis that followed the establishment of the communes compelled Peking to restrict the labor-absorbing rural industries, to restore the private plots, and to slow down the transfer of women from work at home to collectivized agriculture and other "public" pursuits. The constant discussion of the labor problem in the major spheres of agriculture shows that the labor shortage in China's countryside is likely to persist during the next "historical" period—the very period in which the communist master strategists expect to overtake and defeat the non-communist world. Considering these facts, I find Salisbury's and Starlinger's demographic arguments unsound and misleading. Mao certainly will not fall out with Moscow to rid himself of a labor force which is insufficient to meet his own requirements.

Mao's Background

A critical examination of the population argument confirms the need for approaching the problem of Mao's regime with a full awareness of its peculiarities. These peculiarities stem in part from specific features in China's societal background, in part from specific features in the development of the Chinese Communist Party, and in part from specific fea-

1. Wilhelm Starlinger, *Grenzen der Sowjetmacht*. Warburg, 1955, p. 119.

2. Cf. Hupeh Jih-pao, April 16, 1958 and Fukien Jih-pao, February 28, 1958; cf. also Peking Jen-min Jih-pao, April 15, 1958.

tures in the personal history of Red China's supreme leader, Mao Tsetung. In the present context I shall concentrate on the third aspect without, however, totally disregarding the first two, and without forgetting that the recent Moscow-Peking discord is caused as much by Khrushchev's attempt to preserve the supreme authority of the Soviet Union over the international communist hierarchy, as by Mao's attempt to upset it.

Recognition of the patterns of Oriental despotism enables us to distinguish between old and new features in China's totalitarian order, and for that matter in Soviet Russia's society. Knowledge of the history of the Chinese Communist Party helps us to understand the unusual degree to which the Chinese leaders, in contrast to the heads of the Russian and other communist parties, have been conditioned to think in quasi-military terms: for more than twenty years (from 1928 to 1949) most of them had practical experience in handling military as well as political matters.

In the case of Mao, this general conditioning was reinforced by his family background (his father served for many years in the imperial army) and by specific traits of his personality: his decision in 1912 to join (briefly) the regular army, rather than a revolutionary student corps, may have resulted from a combination of these two factors. But while the conditioning of the Chinese communist leaders and Mao's personal predilections go far to explain Peking's 1958 decision to find, through the organization of large and comprehensive communes, a quasi-military solution to the rural crisis, they do not explain Mao's readiness to defy Khrushchev, who strongly opposed this policy.

Chinese "Cult of Personality"

The turning point in Moscow-Peking relations was the death of Stalin in 1953. Stalin's demise loosened Moscow's grip for some time, even on the satellites. It profoundly affected Mao's attitude toward the Soviet Union. Despite Peking's relative independence, Mao had recognized Stalin's supreme, if sometimes heavy-handed, authority. But Mao felt very differently about the new

Soviet leaders, Khrushchev included, whose seniority status in the international communist hierarchy is strikingly inferior to his. To be sure, Mao did not cease to acknowledge Soviet Russia as the socio-historically most advanced "socialist" country in the world and the senior partner in the communist axis. But Moscow's institutional seniority was to some extent counter-balanced by Mao's personal seniority. The resulting pattern of conflicting seniorities was further complicated by a phenomenon that may be called "the growing megalomania of the aging autocrat."

Under conditions of unchecked power, autocratic leadership is the rule;³ and the long-lasting exercise of such leadership tends to inflate the autocrat's ego pathologically. This was certainly the case with Mussolini and Hitler; and Khrushchev's secret speech revealed a similar tendency in Stalin. Mao, who was the master

that he does indeed consider himself a secular demi-god.

This development has been recognized by such analysts as Father LaDany⁴ and Professor Richard L. Walker.⁵ It explains why from 1953 on Mao did not downgrade Stalin as severely as did Moscow and the satellite states. It explains why after Hungary Mao experimented, not too happily, with a little Hungary of his own (the Hundred Flowers policy of 1957), and why Moscow's disagreement did not deter him from promoting his extreme commune policy (which proved unworkable), from wrangling with Nehru over the Indian frontier, or from condemning the policy of temporary peaceful coexistence which Khrushchev is pursuing practically and justifying doctrinally.

Strategy of Communes

Going beyond these conspicuous conflicts, we can assume that Mao set up the communes not only because he and his lieutenants were predisposed to such a solution of the rural crisis, but also because a combined agriculture and industry in the countryside promised special advantages in case of an all-out war. We can even assume that Mao's stress on this perspective is based on his secret conviction that an atomic war (which he expects the communists to win) may weaken the industrially compact Soviet Union more than the Chinese mainland, with its limited primary urban industrial centers and its widely scattered secondary industrial centers. Such a perspective, which conveniently merges with the "orthodox" Leninist outlook would go far to explain Mao's disapproval of the Khrushchev Plan—coexistence until the communist camp is economically, militarily, and politically strong enough to blackmail the West into surrender.

But whatever his differences with Khrushchev, Mao's perspective presupposes the continuing unity of the communist camp. His autocratic megalomania may lessen the rationality of his judgments, but, as in the case of Stalin, it has not destroyed his materialistic way of thinking. His behavior suggests that, despite his grandiose gestures, he realizes both the



of a regional totalitarian regime from the late thirties on and has been the uncontested ruler of 600 million people since 1949, has encouraged the cult of his personality at least since the fifties. Significantly, he is now called the "great leader" of all the people of the Chinese People's Republic. His "ideology" is placed side by side with Marxism-Leninism, and thus by implication above that of Khrushchev. The supra-Byzantine adulation in which he basks shows

3. K. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, New Haven, pp. 107, 345.

4. *China News Analysis*, Hong Kong.

5. "Chairman Mao and the Cult of Personality," *Encounter*, June 1960.

fundamental community of interest between Moscow and Peking and the economically-conditioned political and military superiority of the Soviet Union.

Communist Unity

Believing in the materialistic interpretation of history, just as Hitler believed in his racist interpretation, Mao knows that, so long as the Soviet Union maintains its developmental superiority, it will be Moscow, not Peking, that will spearhead the global communist movement; and he knows that in terms of class solidarity, the Russian and the Chinese leaders are in the same boat.

The Soviet leaders also know this. Having once made the mistake of alienating a communist regime—Yugoslavia—even Stalin watched his step. In this respect, Khrushchev is not likely to act more rigidly, and more stupidly, than his predecessor.

Returning from this brief survey

of the unifying factors to the issue of the Moscow-Peking conflicts, we may say that quite possibly there are even more conflicts than we know of, but in all probability they mean less than we believe. The present disagreements between Moscow and Peking, although real, occur in a socio-historical setting that is as compelling for the future as it was for the past. Considering the undoubtedly rapid, even if overrated, growth of the communist power economy (as distinguished from their subsistence economy), and considering the neutralist sentiment in many non-communist countries and even in some professedly anti-communist countries, the communist strategists expect an ultimate showdown in the foreseeable future, with or without recourse to arms. Mao is as confident as Khrushchev that, whatever the method, the communists will "bury" their enemies, and he has said so repeatedly. For this reason I stand by the statement I wrote a year ago:

When Mao Tse-tung declared that after the First World War the communists controlled 200 million people, that after the Second World War they controlled 900 million, and that the next major holocaust would probably destroy all remaining non-communist power centers, he was expressing his belief in an historical perspective that makes any idea of a break between Peking and Moscow palpably absurd. The purposeful way in which the communists subordinate their subsistence economy to their power economy—and the easy way in which we handle these matters—hardens them in their conviction that, in the crucial spheres of economy, armaments, and diplomacy, their power-directed strategy will necessarily—and soon—overwhelm the free world.

A Western strategy can, and must, frustrate this development. But only a victim of illusion will expect Mao, or whoever succeeds him, to desert what today the Chinese, like the Soviet, leaders hold to be the bandwagon of an historically unavoidable global victory.⁶

6. K. Wittfogel, "A Stronger Oriental Despotism," *China Quarterly*, No. 1, p. 34.

Semantics

The meaning of the theoretical disputes between Peking and Moscow can be understood by relating the abstract words to existing realities.

LIBRA

If the Sino-Soviet alliance is to continue to function properly, on a day-by-day basis, intricate problems rooted in national, racial, geopolitical and technological phenomena must undergo continuous solution. In today's world, the two principal communist powers constitute mutually complementary "revolutionary examples," and, perhaps more important, their military capabilities have become interdependent. Under the circumstances, they are strongly motivated to maintain an image of "proletarian internationalism," at least in their relations with the non-communist world. Yet the same factors which work to cement interdependence can—and do—give rise to frictions. In theory, both powers subordinate national goals to international ones. But the history of the alliance as it has evolved so far suggests that, whenever it becomes necessary to formulate joint strategy, both the Chinese and the Soviet leaders demonstrate a tendency to be influenced by national and racial considerations as well as by commonly shared objectives.

Moreover, at the moment, the domestic needs of the two powers differ vastly. The Chinese, in order to consolidate their controls at home and to drive their population to further sacrifices for "building socialism," still require the image of predatory imperialists allegedly intent on attack at any moment. By contrast, the Soviet Union, preoccupied with its commitment to win the technological race against the United States and the damage it would have to absorb should nuclear war eventuate, no longer can afford such indulgences. Its struggle with the free world must be characterized by subtlety, even in published sources. It is therefore not surprising that, since 1956 at least, Chinese spokesmen have been less

circumspect in their public assessments of the alleged "imperialist threat."

However, April 1960 marked the intensification of public exchange of polemics between key spokesmen for the two powers, which centered around the problem of the role of war as a means of extending communist gains in the nuclear age.

This most recent exchange furnishes an example of how the two powers have attempted to work out a mutually acceptable *modus vivendi* to meet the requirements of the international situation and, simultaneously, to serve their divergent domestic needs. Neither side has shown evidence of abandoning classical communist theory on the role of war, and the Chinese have dramatically reaffirmed its continuing validity. The present discussion will examine the recent so-called debate as it had evolved by mid-August 1960, in terms of its relationship to earlier theory and to some of the broader factors now affecting all Sino-Soviet strategic decisions.

War and World Revolution

Before proceeding to the problem at hand, it is well to recall that, in the final analysis, it is impossible to equate the views expressed by communist leaders in published sources to *actual* strategic decisions taken in private. It is standard practice to conceal intentions and strategy from the enemy, deceiving him, meanwhile, whenever possible. While statements in published sources always must be handled with circumspection, the Sino-Soviet exchanges nevertheless are enlightening.

Chinese spokesmen have tended to emphasize the continuing validity of Lenin's theories on the nature of

imperialism, the inevitability of wars, and the role of violence in establishing communist regimes. By contrast, their Soviet counterparts, without ignoring Lenin, have tended to stress Khrushchev's formulations to the Twentieth and Twenty-First Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

What are the implications, for free world interests, of these recent Sino-Soviet discussions? An answer must be sought, first of all, by comparing them to earlier communist doctrine on the role of war. Second, they must be related to Sino-Soviet military capabilities.

Communist doctrine on the role of war evolved gradually and, of course, was affected by developments in weapons technology as well as by changes in the international political situation. In barest outline, the main elements by the eve of World War II were:

1) The world revolution can be completed only by protracted conflict. While violence is the essence of revolution, military and non-military means of struggle are interrelated, and the continuous process of combining them to extend communist gains will end only when the entire globe has been communized. Until then, war is inevitable.

2) Any war which communist states conduct or support is automatically a "just" war, irrespective of who initiated it or what form it takes.

3) By contrast, any resistance to communist efforts to complete the revolution is "unjust." Hence, even citizens who resist deliberate military invasion by communist forces engage thereby in "unjust" warfare.

4) "Unjust" wars also include any in which communists remain neutral. The nature of capitalism is such that imperialist wars, predatory wars,

civil wars, and wars of national liberation will occur, sometimes without communist encouragement.

5) Communists should initiate war or join the battle already in process, thereby turning an "unjust" war into a "just" one, whenever their policy objectives stand to benefit thereby. However, taking unnecessary risks and entering into conflict prematurely is to be avoided. First, non-military means must be utilized to weaken the enemy and to insure decisive superiority of communist strength. Particular caution will be required as the end of capitalism draws near. The strongest non-communist states may attack the communist powers in a last desperate attempt to preserve their system, doomed by history eventually to disappear from the world.

Events during and following World War II served to prove the validity of earlier theory. With the assistance of Soviet troops, the Soviet Union became a colonial power in Eastern Europe. Mao Tse-tung completed the revolution in China by successes in guerrilla warfare, after having failed, prior to 1949, to reach the same goal by the exercise of "coalition tactics." During the first half of the 1950s, Asian gains were extended to North Korea and North Vietnam, again as the aftermath of military conflict.

In his last major theoretical work, Stalin in 1952 reaffirmed the fact that earlier doctrine was by no means outmoded: "In order to eliminate the inevitability of wars, it is necessary to annihilate imperialism."¹ Mao Tse-tung, who, earlier, had written that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," found no reason to disagree.

The Role of Nuclear War

Meanwhile, technological and political changes continued throughout the globe. On the one hand, new opportunities were emerging for extending communist gains in Asia and Africa by exploiting the instability and anti-Westernism characteristic of "national liberation movements." At the same time, the risks involved in waging war were being rapidly magnified as Soviet efforts to acquire the means to deliver nuclear fire-

LIBRA is the pseudonym of a person who for the past decade has monitored Sino-Soviet developments from the vantage point of Washington.

power on United States targets continued to enjoy highest priority.

Did the existence of nuclear weapons require that fundamental doctrine on the role of war should be modified? Even before the Soviet Union had acquired a significant nuclear capability, communist leaders began to debate the problem. When the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Party convened in 1956, Khrushchev attempted to formulate the "correct" position. His statement about the inevitability of war frequently has been quoted out of context. But an understanding of it is essential to gaining perspective on the more recent exchanges between Moscow and Peking.

Khrushchev told the Twentieth Congress, in essence, that the nature of imperialism had not changed. However, he added, *should certain other conditions be met*, it might be possible to complete the global revolution without experiencing the devastation of a nuclear exchange. *If* the "peace forces" intensified struggles to win the world for communism by all means short of all-out nuclear war, and *if* the neutralist nations continued to cooperate, a situation *might* arise in which wars no longer would be fatalistically inevitable. Khrushchev also took note of the increased desire, in major capitalist nations, to avoid nuclear war.

Only gradually did Khrushchev elaborate a bit on his cautiously phrased formula, in subsequent speeches to communist audiences. While he spoke circuitously, his meaning was clear to his comrades. He could only hope that his remarks would pass unnoticed by his non-communist enemies. Khrushchev implied that conditions were not right for waging nuclear war *at the moment*, and argued that, for a time, emphasis must be on "peaceful co-existence" tactics. While World War III would mean the end of capitalism, he said, nuclear warfare also would bring setbacks to "the camp of peace." Communism would survive *only* after the Soviet Union had absorbed tre-

mendous damage. Under the circumstances, he told the Twenty-First Congress of the Soviet Party in January 1959, it would be well to try to work out a way to exclude wars from the life of society even before the world revolution had been completed. Again, certain conditions would first have to be met: The Soviet Union would have to become a mighty industrial power, and the communist bloc would have to produce more than half the entire world's industrial output. Even then, the nature of capitalism would not change. But if, in the meantime, neutralist sentiments in underdeveloped nations also had continued to expand, and the "forces for peace" in the major Western nations had continued to grow, it might be possible to avoid *global* war. In short, if all these conditions could be met, it might be possible to force the major Western powers to surrender without an exchange of nuclear blows.

Open Aggression Avoided

Neither Chou En-lai, who subsequently addressed the Congress in behalf of the Chinese, nor Mao Tse-tung, who signed the official greetings from the Chinese party, took issue with Khrushchev's estimate. Further, the Chinese endorsed Khrushchev's optimistic claim that when the new Soviet Seven-Year Plan had been completed in 1965, the communist bloc would be well on the road to winning the lead-time race.

The communist leaders have not disclosed, in any detail, their current doctrine on limited war. Their behavior during the crises which have arisen in recent years suggests an awareness that limited wars could expand into global war. This introduces the requirement of assessing each conflict with extreme caution, and of refraining from sending troops to participate overtly whenever the risks of expanding the conflict might be increased thereby. Whenever major crises have arisen, such as the Suez Crisis of 1956, and the Middle Eastern Crisis of 1958, both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples Republic have confined themselves to verbal threats, mass protest rallies condemning "imperialist aggression," and similar propagandistic devices. The probability that both powers have

¹. Stalin, *Ekonomichekie problemy sotsializma v SSSR*, Moscow, 1952, p. 86.

furnished military equipment to "national liberation movements" and other local insurrectionists cannot be overlooked, but overt intervention has been avoided.

Complementary Armed Might

The "division of labor," as it were, between the Chinese and the Soviet military forces has its roots in the varying domestic requirements of the two powers and in the nature of their respective military capabilities. In today's world, these capabilities have become interdependent.

On the one hand, the Chinese will remain reliant on the Soviet Union's long-range nuclear striking capability and other advanced weapons systems, as they are developed, for a long time to come. The Soviet leaders have evidenced fears that an "nth country" problem might arise in the bloc eventually, and, presumably, atomic weapons have been denied to the Chinese. Nor does China yet have the technological and industrial base required to produce suitable carriers for weapons of global range. Since military technology continues to develop at a rapid rate, today's advanced weapons tend to become obsolete more quickly than formerly, and it is the Soviet Union which has the facilities required to continue the research and development race with the United States. Nevertheless, the Chinese have expressed an intent to attain a nuclear capability eventually, with or without Soviet assistance. Should they succeed in acquiring a token capability, undoubtedly they would press for the right to use it in waging limited wars.

Even if China has no nuclear weapons now, her current military forces are by no means outmoded for limited peripheral operations. Under some circumstances, the Soviet Union might be forced to rely on them. It is the Chinese who perfected communist guerrilla warfare techniques and who retain the best capability for waging this type of conflict, particularly in the tropics. Guerrilla warfare is the military means best suited to exploit whatever "revolutionary situations" may arise in Asia, Africa, or even Latin America. The risks involved in attempts to exploit localized opportunities as they arise are reduced by the mere existence of

Soviet nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the nature of guerrilla warfare is such that concealment of assistance to local insurrectionists is not difficult.

Given the different roles their military forces can play in any conflict, and the other factors involved, the recent published exchanges between the two powers on the role of war make sense. The dispute has revolved around three points: first, the timing of war moves; second, the current effectiveness of Soviet nuclear deterrent capabilities; and third, the question of whether or not Soviet military technology is, at the moment, sufficiently superior to permit an effective victory over the United States if war is initiated now.

Lenin Reaffirmed

In its April 15, 1960 issue, the theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist Party, *Red Flag*, opened the debate. A long article commemorating the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birthday contains one of the most outspoken summaries of classical communist theory on the role of war to be published in recent years. As such, it both reaffirms and updates the 1928 resolution of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern. Main points in the *Red Flag* argument were:

1) None of Lenin's theories on violence, revolution and war have been rendered obsolete by the existence of nuclear weapons.

2) Wars will continue as long as capitalism exists. "Since World War II, there has been continuous and unbroken warfare." Did not the many local wars which have occurred in the world in the meantime count as wars, even though nuclear weapons have not been used and the conflict has not expanded?

3) The devastation a global nuclear war would inflict on communist states is worth absorbing. Communist regimes then could be established "on the debris of a dead imperialism."

4) It is impossible to establish a communist regime without the use of violence:



Even if it is compelled not to use these new weapons, the imperialist state will of course still remain an imperialist institution . . . until it is overthrown and replaced by . . . the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . Revolution means the use of . . . violence by the oppressed class, it means revolutionary war.

5) Lenin long ago refuted Marx's earlier views that peaceful transition to communism was possible in the United States and Great Britain. Lenin's views apply to our day.

6) In general, neither "coalition tactics" nor other means of peaceful transition to communism are likely to succeed in the future any better than they did in the past:

When in the world a certain capitalist country is already surrounded by socialism, there might be a greater possibility for the peaceful development of the revolution. But, even then, peaceful development of the revolution should never be regarded as the only possibility. It is necessary, therefore, to be prepared at the same time for the other possibility: nonpeaceful development of the revolution.²

In past exchanges of polemics between communists it has not been unusual to attempt to preserve an image of "monolithic unity" by specifically blaming one offender—for example, Tito—for theoretical errors, while actually intending to attack completely different members of the hierarchy. Certainly, at first glance, some of the Chinese accusations would apply to Soviet policy. It is important to note, therefore, that passages of the same article reiterated standard communist doctrine on the necessity for temporary alliances, periods of "peace," the signing of agreements with the enemy to gain time, and the like. Lenin's peace treaties, Stalin's pact with Hitler in 1939, and the Chinese truce with the Kuomintang in 1936 are specifically cited as examples of the necessity, on occasion, to emphasize temporary periods of "coexistence." Further, the Chinese also quoted Lenin to argue that, since the global revolution must be completed in stages, during certain periods it will be necessary to "compel" non-communist states to coexist.

Veteran theoretician Otto Kuusinen, one of the few remaining "old Bolsheviks" in the Soviet hierarchy,

2. Peking, *New China News Agency*, April 19, 1960. Excerpts may be found in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 4, July, 1960, pp. 666-681.

delivered the speech on behalf of the Soviet Party's Central Committee to the Moscow rally celebrating Lenin's birthday on April 25, 1960. He, too, stressed that the nature of imperialism had not changed. However, he took pains to point out:

The change in the balance of power in the international arena, the growth of the might of the socialist camp, and the obvious disastrous consequences of a new war all contribute to a division among the ruling circles of the imperialist states.

Some sober-thinking Western statesmen had begun to believe nuclear war would be madness and, under the circumstances, he argued, patience was required. Kuusinen then stressed the current necessity for "coalition" and "coexistence" tactics, concluding his assessment with a reiteration and an expansion of Khrushchev's earlier predictions to the Twenty-First Party Congress. By the end of the twentieth century, he claimed, non-communist colonialism would have disappeared. The Soviet Union would have become the world's foremost industrial power, and other communist nations would have made significant technological advances. New nations would have joined the socialist camp. Kuusinen was more cautious concerning the total capitulation of the United States by 2000. He quoted Senator Humphrey—out of context—to argue that even in the United States the masses might rise to overthrow capitalism. But he deliberately refrained from predicting that the revolution would have been completed in the United States by the turn of the century.³

The exchange continued along the same lines, and Khrushchev himself entered the debate when the various parties, gathered at Bucharest. He told the comrades, in a speech to the Rumanian Congress on June 21, 1960, that the nature of imperialism had not changed; nevertheless, it was well to be circumspect in public assessments. Absorbing nuclear retaliation was a sobering possibility, and the revolution was proceeding nicely without it, for the moment. True, he admitted, wars would continue until the capitalist powers had been reduced to a few states "as small as the buttons on a coat," but nuclear

wars must be properly timed. If patience were exercised, perhaps even the United States would give up without inflicting nuclear retaliation on communist nations.

Coexistence, a Deception

The Chinese speaker at the Congress repeated some of the points *Red Flag* had made earlier, in more circumspect language. Then the Bucharest Communiqué, signed by all parties, reaffirmed the 1957 Moscow "Peace Manifesto" as the correct guide to current conflict strategies. It is significant that this document includes reference both to the importance of emphasizing "peaceful coexistence" tactics for the moment and the necessity to complete the revolution by "armed class struggle" in states possessing strong military capabilities. This very same quotation on the role of "armed class struggle" has appeared time and again since the Moscow "Peace Manifesto" first was published. For example, exact sentences may be found in an article published in *Kommunist* (No. 10, July 1960), which reiterated in detail the positions, already described here, taken by Soviet spokesmen throughout the current debate. They also were emphasized in the major text on current communist tactics published in Moscow in the autumn of 1959 (O. V. Kuusinen, ed., *Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma*, p. 529), and were quickly reprinted in a summary of the book published in the *World Marxist Review* (November, 1959).

The other Sino-Soviet statements during the debate are too numerous to summarize in detail, but have followed a similar vein, taking their cue from the four major statements which have been examined here. All have reflected that three points are being argued between the two powers: (a) timing of war moves; (b) the current value of the Soviet deterrent shield in permitting freedom of action to wage local warfare; and (c) the relative balance of military superiority between the United States and the Soviet Union at the moment.

The principal conclusion which may be drawn from the recent exchanges is that the nature of communism has not changed. However much they may argue over the preferred timing of war moves and the best means of

proceeding in the continuing joint struggle against the free world, neither Moscow nor Peking has, as yet, shown any signs of abandoning classical theories on the role of war. Nor has either abandoned the race to build up military strength. In fact, Khrushchev specifically stated in January, 1960 that new, more formidable weapons would continue to appear in the Soviet arsenal, and the Chinese forces are undergoing gradual modernization.

The Chinese seem to assess current opportunities to get on with the revolution more optimistically than their Soviet counterparts. They seem to feel that, given the Soviet nuclear deterrent shield, they should be permitted greater freedom of action to lend overt support to battles for "national liberation" and to engage in other types of military conflict with conventional weapons. In addition, their statements suggest a belief that current Soviet military capabilities are sufficient to defeat the United States now, and that whatever retaliation may be involved in the attempt is a price well worth paying. By contrast, their more sophisticated allies realize that it is necessary to proceed with caution, to avoid a nuclear exchange if possible, and to attain the military superiority over the United States they still believe they lack before unleashing a global war. Khrushchev has summarized the matter succinctly: "We must not be in a rush and rashly introduce what is not yet ripe. This would lead to . . . compromise of our cause. But neither can we be content with what has been achieved, since that would spell stagnation."⁴

In the final analysis, whether or not World War III will occur will depend not on exchanges of polemics between Moscow and Peking, but on the ability of the United States to retain a clear-cut military superiority over the Soviet Union in the future. Furthermore, a way must be found to convince the communist leaders that, in making their own strategic assessments, they must learn to accept the fact that they cannot win the weapons lead-time race.

4. Khrushchev to the 21st Congress, CPSU, as quoted in N. Matkovsky, "On the 40th Anniversary of the Publication of V. I. Lenin's Book, 'Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder,'" *Pravda*, June 12, 1960, during one presentation of the Soviet position during the recent Sino-Soviet debate.

Disinformation

Is "the conflict between Moscow and Peking" only the synthetic product of a deliberate Communist campaign of "inspiration" and "misinformation"?

Communist "inspiration" and "misinformation," two important tools of intelligence and propaganda, have expanded monstrously in recent years. As a system, communism thrives on fiction, which it builds over truth. The so-called "capitalism" which communists attack is fiction: a mythical image woven by Marxism-Leninism around a grain of truth. Fiction serves the "construction of socialism." Fiction, with imaginary capitalist flaws acting as background for the illusory qualities of communism, becomes the magnet attracting outside sympathies. But where fiction is invaluable to communism, is in countering attempts of the Free World to evaluate "socialism" and its potential. Fiction is then used to confuse observers, to obstruct correct judgment, and at all costs to prevent concrete and constructive anti-communism. This result is achieved through inspiration and misinformation. They lead the West to erroneous calculation, and erroneous calculation brings defeat. And the defeat of capitalism is the major communist objective.

Bolshevik Beginnings

Moscow has used misinformation from the moment that the Bolsheviks seized power. In setting up its program, the Soviet Union had recourse to past Czarist practices, German experience, and some traditional forms of Chinese camouflage and framing. Lenin's *Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder* also contributed to the elaboration of Soviet inspiration and misinformation principles. From the beginning, Soviet leaders, including Lenin and Stalin, used misinformation tactics in dealing with outsiders.¹

Lenin's precept that communism

will be constructed by its enemies acts as an axiom in Soviet inspiration. It is for the enemy to make the move which will undermine his own interests and aid the communist cause. Soviet participation is confined to inspiration of this move. A further trait peculiar to Soviet inspiration technique is the discord between the official Soviet line and the line followed by communist misinformation. Official propaganda, in order to impress and intimidate the enemy, stresses communist superiority and the successes of the Soviet system. Misinformation stresses "antagonisms" and "conflicts" behind the Iron Curtain, in order to raise in enemy ranks expectations of communist collapse. Instead of adhering strictly, as does the doctrine, to the theory that revolution will destroy "imperialism," misinformation advances the idea of a peaceful transition to communism, and lulls the enemy with dreams of long-term "peaceful co-existence." The enemy remains inactive, and communism thus gains the time required for development.

This contrast in approach demands a subdivision of tasks. The official line is left to communists and ardent fellow-travelers. "Inspired" information, although sometimes traceable to Soviet sources, is circulated by non-communists. Seeming to come from

1. Lenin's contacts with Americans (Raymond Robbins, Frank Arthur Vanderlip, Sidney Hillman, and others) illustrates this point.

2. For example, *Soviet Communism: a New Civilization*, by two respected Fabians, Sydney and Beatrice Webb, written exclusively from Soviet material; *La Nouvelle Russie*, by Ed. Herriot, which in 1922 preached contact with communism as a means toward its democratization; *Soviet Asia Mission*, nominally by Henry A. Wallace, but actually written by a communist (Andrew Steiger). One of the most spectacular cases was *Three Capitals*, by V. Shulgin, who was a sincere anti-communist yet quite unconsciously submitted the book for editing to the Soviet secret service in Moscow.

NATALIE GRANT

circles believed in the West to be reliable, misinformation from non-communist sources renders great service to the Soviets. "Inspired" books have often paved the road to Western concessions.²

To increase the effectiveness of misinformation, communists correlate its themes with concrete trends of Western opinion. Views clashing with current sentiment are seldom inspired. Sentiments in the nature of "faith in international understanding" or "fear of war" are fertile soil for misinformation. Communism capitalizes on wishful thinking, that weakness shared by all men, who believe what they wish to believe more readily than the truth. It was wishful thinking that led public opinion, inspired by Moscow, to view the New Economic Policy of the twenties as evidence that Russia had abandoned communism, and the Stalinism of the thirties as a rejection of world revolution in favor of a national state. It was wishful thinking again which during World War II was largely responsible for the idea that after the war was over a liberal form of government would replace the Soviet totalitarian system.

Success of Propaganda

In the post-1945 expansion of communism from "one state" to a "world socialist system," a number of factors contributed to the increased success of inspiration and misinformation tactics: the constant friction between Western countries; the multiplication of political and intelligence services; a decline in the intellectual level of Western political leaders; severe censorship in Soviet countries; the entrance on the political scene of "professional anti-communism"; the abun-

dance of forgeries and fabrications.³ New centers of misinformation were established, and the old ones stepped up output. Inspired material on Soviet problems originates at present from a variety of "primary" sources (Paris, London, Berlin, Geneva, Vienna, Stockholm, Hongkong, Tokyo and even Rio de Janeiro), with Belgrade and Warsaw (since October 1956) taking current precedence. Soviet misinformation services become even bolder as the Western press, in its contest for scoops, blindly accepts the sensational news. Soviet and Chinese censors, for example, known for their severity, readily permit the dispatch of incredible news reports about "conflicts" behind the Iron Curtain—reports which, if even half true, would be firmly suppressed.

West's Susceptibility

In certain countries the communist parties are now beginning to participate, contrary to former practice, in the spread of misinformation. These are usually parties which have met with failure in attempts to build up a substantial local following. The "best informed" on the Sino-Soviet "conflict" appear to be, for example, the communists in England, the United States, and some countries in Latin America. While prior to the war Soviet inspiration suggested the existence of conflicts within the Soviet Union, it has now enlarged the arena to the entire communist bloc. The intimation is that de-Stalinization is being followed by "democratic evolution," and that communism is bound to collapse through the development of revisionism, "national communism," deviations and friction in the top strata. The Soviet-inspired presentation to the West of "Titoism" and "Gomulkaism" is illustrative of the argument. There is no doubt that dependence of Western public opinion on communist-supplied data has increased the receptivity of the Free World to ideas of the "superiority of

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communism," as well as to the belief that "antagonistic contradictions between capitalism and communism" can be resolved by peaceful methods.

Sino-Soviet relations, as a key problem in communist policies in Asia and toward the United States, have always occupied a central position in the communist inspiration program. Conditions for the circulation of Soviet misinformation on Asia were exceptionally favorable in the United States. Although America confronted important political issues in Asia, American public opinion maintained a detached attitude toward Asian developments. Basically, Americans were uninformed on China and Japan (and even on Russia), and scientific research in this field was neglected. For information on Asia, Americans usually fell back on material available in Europe or supplied by immigrants. Few efforts were made to analyze or confirm this material. The relative lack of interest of Americans in ideology and dialectics, and in the long-term history of peoples, made matters worse. Interdependence of historical development was seldom taken into account, and an inordinate importance was attributed to separate facts. Communism, however, as understood by Marxism-Leninism, develops by a lengthy process involving both advances and retreats; concentration on a single event inevitably distorts perspective.

This attitude on the part of Americans opened the doors wide to communist inspiration. The uncritical American tendency to oppose all trends felt to be reactionary, chauvinist or fascist further contributed to the success of the communist tactics. Americans stressed the necessity for

an "objectivity" which, in the study of communism, is equivalent, at best, to a non-critical utilization of communist sources and data. Myths, sensations, and fictitious reports multiplied. These bred theories resting on false premises, which caused the American administration to misunderstand communist moves. The United States thus often found itself sympathizing, and even siding, with communist elements presented as "progressive" by Soviet inspiration.

China's Mis-History

For the communists, who believed they could profit from "imperialist war" in the Far East,⁴ China has always been a first-rate weapon against "capitalist imperialism." Communist planning has always regarded Chinese revolution as a step to revolution in semi-dependent and colonial countries.⁵ Chinese communism, as a party, appeared in 1921 and remained weak for some time thereafter. This explains Moscow's interest in the Chinese nationalist independence movement, rather than in the "proletariat." Concrete conditions, therefore, motivated Moscow's leadership over the growth of Chinese communism. The headquarters of the Chinese revolution were located for many years first in Russia and then elsewhere within the Soviet borders. The Soviet drive into Asia, the formation of Outer Mongolia into a satellite, and Soviet policies in Manchuria were

4. War between the United States and Japan was a premise of Soviet strategy under Lenin, as well as under Stalin: "American imperialism is the most dangerous to the toiling masses. . . . In the coming world war. . . . American imperialism will play the leading role. . . . The American imperialists are going to miscalculate because they overlook China's historical role in Asia and on the Pacific. . . . Liberated China will become a magnet for all peoples of the yellow race. . . . China will become a major power on the Pacific to menace the capitalist world of three continents. China must inevitably clash with American imperialism. . . . The Kuomintang's most important task at the moment is to foster the revolution by exploiting antagonisms between the powers that encircle China. . . . America's advance in China threatens the very existence of Japanese imperialism. This danger may hasten the armed clash between the United States and Japan. . . ." (D. Manuilski at the Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, Nov. 22-Dec. 16, 1926, *Puti Mironoi Revolyutsii*, Moscow, 1927, vol. I, p. 420-435.)

5. "The great events in China which are happening before our eyes, show the advance guard of the European proletariat very plainly what powerful reserves we have in the East. . . . The events in China will revolutionize the other countries in the East. . . . What the Russian revolution of 1905 did for Turkey, Persia, and China, the present great movement in China will do for Indochina, India, etc." (G. Zinoviev, *Pravda*, June 28, 1925).

3. Among them may be mentioned books by non-existent individuals citing forged documents, sensational revelations by "rewriters," and compilations based on non-existent sources. They play a role of great importance in shaping Western public opinion. Some of the better known include: the writings of Budu Svanidze, non-existent nephew of Stalin; Litvinov's "diaries"; the "memoirs" of a "French governess" attached to the Stalin family, cited recently by a Washington commentator; *Khrushchev the Ukrainian*, by Victor Alexandrov (founded almost exclusively on non-existent documents). Their number is legion.

largely determined by the absence of a sizeable organization of Chinese communists. The weakness of the Chinese party led the Soviets to collaborate with the Kuomintang, which they viewed as a weapon to promote revolution and as a cover under which to construct the authentic communist movement in China.⁶

A survey of communist misinformation on Chinese problems in the years following 1918 would entail a complete review of the history of China and the Soviet Union over that period. Every shift in Moscow policy and every change in the Chinese political situation brought a new twist in communist inspiration. The campaign of "inspiration" on China, directed at concealing from the West the communist advance toward establishment of a Sino-Soviet monolith, may, however, be roughly subdivided into four main periods. They are, 1) 1918 to 1927; 2) 1927 to World War II; 3) World War II to the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic; 4) the period following the creation of the CPR.

Phases of the Revolution

The 1918-27 period was marked mainly by communist "collaboration" with non-communist groups (the Kuomintang). The official communist line (expressed by the Comintern at its Second Congress in 1920) called on Chinese revolutionaries to refrain from premature "sovietization."⁷ Slogans of independence and national unity were advanced.⁸ At the same time the Chinese Communist Party was strengthened and trained for the moment when it would assume lead-

6. The success of this gradual preparation of China for the communist seizure of power inspired the Soviets to apply the same method with amendments on other occasions. One may trace, for example, elements of the Chinese experiment in the still embryonic Cuban "revolution."

7. The similarity of this line with theses recently launched by Moscow may indicate that countries now exist where premature "sovietization" would be undesirable to communism, as it would have been in China, where it might have aroused the West, including the United States, to immediate action. In this connection see footnote 6.

8. "The communists support every national revolutionary movement against imperialism." (Fourth Congress of the Comintern, 1922.)

9. "A twofold task confronts the communist and labor parties of the colonies and semi-colonial countries: on one hand they struggle for the most radical solution of the tasks of bourgeois-democratic revolution directed toward winning over state political independence; on the other hand, they organize the workers and peasant masses for struggle for their social and class interests, utilizing thereby all the conflicts of interest in the national bourgeois democratic camp." (*Kommunisticheski Internatsional v Dokumentakh*, 1919-1932, Moscow, 1933, pp. 321-322.)

ership over the masses.⁹ The warning not to skip the "stage of democratic revolution," and not to enter the road of "proletarian dictatorship" ahead of time, was again sounded in 1926, at the Sixth Enlarged Plenary Session of the Comintern Executive.

The transitory communist slogan that the peasants are "the basic deciding factor in the Chinese national movement" contributed to the creation of propaganda myths claiming that Chinese communists were merely "agrarian reformers." Further inspired by individual instances of deviation caused by the equivocal tactics of the Comintern and the Chinese communists, European and American commentators launched stories of an alleged "Chinese schism."

After severing relations with the Kuomintang in 1927, the Chinese Communist Party, obedient to instructions from Stalin and the Comintern, shifted to a revolutionary policy opposing the Kuomintang and "imperialists." In 1937, the Chinese Party, along with the entire international communist movement, adopted popular front tactics. It became clear, with the stabilization of the Chinese Party and the elaboration of a Chinese communist doctrine (mainly by



Mao Tse-tung), that the Chinese revolution was viewed by communism as a continuation of the Soviet Russian revolution, and the Chinese communist drive to power over China as a second stage toward a "world Soviet republic," in accordance with Lenin's precepts.

In this period the Moscow misinformation line minimized the significance of the development of communism in Asia, and encouraged support of policies profitable to the Soviet Union. Communist inspiration tried to show that:

- a) "the sovereign republics" (the Far Eastern Republic, Outer

Mongolia) are independent and democratic;

- b) Chinese communists are agrarian reformers and the Chinese Communist Party a national party without international communist, Comintern, or Soviet affiliation;
- c) Soviet and communist imperialism are non-existent, and there is no synchronized strategy of communist aggression;
- d) Japan is an enemy common to China, the United States and the Soviet Union, and a war against Japan can gain political and economic advantages for the United States in Asia;
- e) Collaboration with communism is profitable to America.

Even when detailed and concrete the non-communist publications subsequently devoted to this period of Soviet infiltration seldom discuss inspiration and misinformation as important aspects of Soviet infiltration. Nor do they note the success of Soviet inspiration in shaping American and world public opinion, and in impressing upon the minds of Westerners ideas which may prove fatal to the future of the Free World. Yet it was in this period that a major role in inspiration was played by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the periodicals, books, conferences and lectures which the IPR sponsored. The IPR, now forgotten by the general public, was a first-rate instrument of communist propaganda and misinformation, as well as a tool by which Soviet military intelligence got, via America, data on Japan, China, and Great Britain. The Institute was used by the communists "to influence United States public opinion," "to promote the interests of the Soviet Union in the United States" and "to orientate American Far Eastern policies toward communist objectives."¹⁰ Many organizations linked with IPR¹¹

10. The Institute's activity over the 1925-50 period was examined in detail at Hearings held from July 25, 1951, to June 20, 1952, by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate's Committee on the Judiciary, 82nd Congress, 2nd session.

11. These include: Allied Labor News, *Amerasia*, American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, American Friends of the Chinese People and its official publication *China Today*, American-Russian Institute, China Aid Council, Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy and its official publication *Far East Spotlight*, Federated Press, The Friends of Chinese Democracy, Japanese-American Committee for Democracy, Russian War Relief, *Soviet Russia Today*, etc.

were engaged in activity similarly serving communist objectives. Over a period of some 25 years (1925-50), about 5,000 persons worked, deliberately or as dupes, at supplying false information concerning Asia and Soviet Asian policy to the American people, and inspiring views desirable to the Soviet Union. The information was distributed through a number of channels and by many methods. Widely read books, pamphlets, and magazines were published, and articles and book reviews appeared in leading American journals. Soviet-inspired books published in those days are still in all libraries, public and university. Their influence on scientific research is disastrous. Persons now studying Soviet policies, China, or the Pacific area must work their way through a jungle of communist propaganda which continues to be submitted to the reader as "objective." Young specialists on Soviet and communist affairs often reveal, unfortunately, the influence of this "objective" reading material.¹²

Conditioned by this flood of inspired literature, American opinion more readily accepted the communist line stressed by openly communist publications. There was no shortage of communist material: it was circulated both by the American Party and by Soviet diplomatic agents, unofficial prior to 1933, and official after recognition.¹³

Wooing the U.S.

In the third period, which lasted until the formation of the Chinese People's Republic, communist inspiration centered on the United States, by then the principal target of misinformation. The communist aim was to influence the United States to participate in Chinese economic renovation, after having cleared China of Japanese occupation troops. Since aid to a communist group linked with Moscow might have been opposed in America, the communists tried to present Chinese communism as an independent national movement. Mao Tse-tung and Stalin played their part in the inspiration campaign. Following the "dissolution" of the Comintern (1943) for example, Mao Tse-tung insisted that the Third International had stopped interfering in Chinese affairs after 1935. He made

this point on several occasions. Stalin, too, in 1944, asserted in a conversation with Mr. Averell Harriman that "the Chinese communists are not real communists . . . they are real patriots and they want to fight Japan."¹⁴ In talks with Harry Hopkins, Stalin followed an identical line. So did other Soviet leaders (among them Molotov)¹⁵ in talks with various Americans (e.g., Patrick J. Hurley, Donald M. Nelson).

With the formation of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949, the inspiration line underwent a change. The communists introduced the subject of "contradictions" between China

"*Pravda* charged that the Chinese leaders suffered from the same 'infantile sickness of leftism' that Lenin denounced..."

Time, June 27, 1960

[the truth is that *Pravda* has never charged this. N.G.]

"As for Soviet-Chinese relations in general, the President now feels there is tangible evidence that the two communist countries are having strong differences."

Washington Post and Times-Herald, June 18, 1960

and the Soviet Union, a theme still prominent in communist misinformation.

"Contradictions" are a complex, multi-faceted problem. The seizure of authority by communists, wherever it takes place, and the "construction of socialism" are always accompanied by struggle and conflict. Soviet history is permeated by the still unresolved conflict which separates the men in power from the people. In order to confuse the outside world, the regime often cloaks internal conflicts with misinformation and distortions. Internal contradictions are presented as external, and their social and ideological nature carefully disguised. Ideological opposition thus becomes "intelligence activity for the imperialist enemy." When the regime needs a respite or plans to strike at the morale or the material welfare of the West, the communists customarily launch fictitious rumors regarding

non-existent internal conflict. Such were some of the past stories on the outbreak of revolutionary action in the population or on bitter battles raging among Soviet leaders. These served to tranquilize the West and appease its concern over the progress of communism.

Confusing the West

The postwar transition from "one state" to a "socialist system" intensified the contradictions inherent in communism. New conflicts of interest arose. While in the past, contradictions between China and the Soviet Union had been limited to the Party sphere, the formation of the Chinese Peoples Republic extended them to relations between two states. The communist objective is to resolve these contradictions as rapidly as possible, because only then can communism move to the next step in its program: the "final victory" over

12. Pro-communist literature on China which laid the base for a "scientific" approach to the study of the Pacific, includes: *China's Millions* and *Chinese Conquer China*, by Anna Louise Strong; *In Search of History*, by V. Sheehan; *China Shakes the World*, by J. Belden; *Two Years with the Chinese Communists*, by C. and W. Band; *Unfinished Revolution in China*, by I. Epstein; eleven books by O. Lattimore (among them *Solution in Asia* and *Situation in Asia*); *China's Wartime Politics and China's Crisis*, by L. K. Rosinger; *People on our Side*, by E. Snow; *Battle Hymn of China*, by A. Smedley; *Challenge of Red China*, by G. Stein; *New Frontier in Asia*, by P. J. Jaffe; *Report from Red China*, by H. Forman; *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution*, by T. C. Woo; *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, by Tang Leang-li, and many others. They constitute in some American libraries the only sources available on the Chinese problem.

13. The following is a partial list of direct communist propaganda on China published in the United States in that period: *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, by N. Bukharin; *Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic*, by Bela Kuhn; *Red China*, by Mao Tse-tung; *The Chinese Soviets and Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East*, by V. A. Yakhontov; *Heroic China*, by P. A. Mif. These books were Stalinist. A distorted view of the Chinese problem was also supplied by Trotskyist literature, such as *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, by L. Trotsky and *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, by H. R. Isaacs.

14. *The China Tangle. The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission*, by Herbert Feiss, 1953, p. 140.

15. Molotov presented the situation as follows: "The Soviet Government could bear no responsibility for internal affairs or developments in China for which at times it had been unjustifiably held responsible. . . . In part of that country the people were half starved and miserable; and thus they called themselves 'communists,' but they had no relation to communism; they used the name as a way of expressing their discontent over their condition; but if these were improved they would forget that they were 'communists'; and so if the United States helped these unfortunate people there would be fewer 'communists' in China. . . . The Soviet people would be very glad if the United States helped China. . . ." (Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. *The War they Waived and the Peace they Sought*, by Herbert Feiss, 1957, pp. 408-409.)

capitalism. A proper understanding of Sino-Soviet conflicts of interest would strengthen the position of the Free World and point Western policies in the right direction.

To prevent correct appreciation of Sino-Soviet problems, communism has again turned to misinformation, the method tested with such success in the past. The principal objective of misinformation remains unchanged: a demoralization of the West. The United States is lulled by illusions that it should bide its time because "splits" and "conflicts" will bring disintegration of the world communist machine. American public opinion is pacified by hopes for a lengthy period of "peaceful coexistence." Rumors suggest Sino-Soviet conflict in planning, with Moscow intent on peace, and Peking on military action. Old theories, once sponsored by the Institute of Pacific Relations, that "schism" and ideological conflict are tearing Mao and the Kremlin apart have returned to the scene. Absurd "Kremlinology" is being supplemented by no less nonsensical "Pekinology."

Detecting the Truth

No private observer is in a position to trace all the channels of infiltration of Soviet misinformation into the West. Nor can one draw a line between intentional misinformation, on the one hand, and naive wishful thinking or competition for "scoops" on the other. Trotskyist circles (members of the Fourth International, which, hand in hand with Moscow and Peking, has been fanning revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) seem to have become one of the prolific sources of misinformation.¹⁶ From a practical standpoint, the crux of the matter is the fact that the supply of misinformation to the American public could be prevented. The study of original documents rather than unverified translations, the application of scientific methods of research to both the Soviet and Chinese versions

16. Pierre Frank, leader of the Fourth International, whose article on "Les Divergences entre Chinois et Soviétiques" appeared in Paris, in July, 1960, is, for example, an ardent proponent of the Sino-Soviet "conflict." So is Isaac Deutscher, the Trotskyist historian, whose article on "Khrushchev, Mao, and the Wolf of Chungshan" in *The Reporter* of August 4, 1960, is a concoction of rumors, gossip, fiction, and unfounded assumptions.

From High Places

"The Chinese communists have long been openly disgruntled with even the appearance of peaceful intent by the Soviet leaders . . ."

Department of State Bulletin, June 20, 1960 (Vice President Nixon's speech at SEATO meeting)

"[The Chinese] implicitly accuse Khrushchev of revisionism [and the Russians] accuse the Chinese implicitly of a left-wing deviation."

Problems of Communism, Nos. 3 and 4, 1960 (a publication widely read outside America as reflecting U.S. governmental views)

of Marxism-Leninism and Party history, and the abandonment of an atomistic approach to subjects requiring the study of long-term processes, would soon disclose the true nature of "inspired" information. Western commentators would then cease to interpret as "serious conflict" the normal discrepancies arising from the difference in the level of development reached by Soviet and Chinese communism, a factor always taken into consideration by the communists themselves. Nor would Western observers continue to overlook the fact that special tasks are performed by each member of the "world socialist system," so that there is a planned difference in the strategic lines followed by the Soviet Union and by China. As the situation stands at present, careful strategic synchronization by communism is often viewed in the West as a "contradiction."

The Summit Conference and the American electoral campaign brought a rerudescence of misinformation—a normal development, since Soviet inspiration intensifies at moments of

crisis in the enemy camp. Sino-Soviet relations—both because of their critical importance and because of the West's ignorance concerning them—were the subject particularly selected for the occasion. The manner in which the avalanche of misinformation was greeted by American public opinion indicates that the communist move was a success. In the United States the campaign quickly aroused hopes for a split in the communist camps and a resulting possibility for an understanding with the Soviet Union.

A Nonexistent Schism

A careful study of the material forming the alleged grounds for concluding that there is a serious Sino-Soviet conflict proves the absence of any objective foundation for such a belief. There is no evidence to support the arbitrary announcements of commentators that Mao and Khrushchev differ in their theories concerning the path—peaceful or military—to revolution. My own direct examination of material issued in the past few months and over recent years—including the primary Soviet and Chinese Communist periodicals, the minutes of the Eleventh Session of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions and of the Third Congress of Rumanian Workers, the speeches by Khrushchev, Mao Tse-tung and other Soviet and Chinese political leaders—leads to the astonishing conclusion that all statements regarding the existence of serious disagreement between Moscow and Peking on foreign policy, war, peace, revolution, or attitude toward imperialism are an invention. All are the fruit of fertile imagination and unbased speculation.

There has been no Chinese attack



on the Soviet communists, nor has there been any Soviet attack on the Chinese communists. There is no disagreement in the interpretation of Lenin's doctrine of war and peace. Nor has there been deviation by either party from the principles of communist strategy as expressed in the Moscow Declaration of November, 1957. Instead of imaginary attacks on Khrushchev's "pacifism," all important Chinese articles emphasize the unity of the socialist camp "headed by the Soviet Union." Instead of dramatized ideological conflict, the Soviet and Chinese press publish identical attacks against "revisionists."

The accompanying excerpts from the American press will illustrate the character of the misinformation circulated by leading newspapers and periodicals. Misinformation falls into two categories. In one instance, a false impression is produced through the utilization of clichés, adverbs or

17. The extent of absurdity reached may be judged from a news item (*Washington Post*, July 31, 1960), announcing that "Soviet seeks to shift Troublesome Molotov," which has Molotov conspiring with Mao against Khrushchev and Khrushchev failing in his efforts to separate Mao from Molotov by . . . assigning the latter to a Euro-Soviet embassy!

18. See "D'un Prétendu Conflit Doctrinal entre le PC Soviétique et le PC Chinois," by Branko Lavitch in No. 239 of June 16-30, 1960, and "Khrushchev: Fiction et Réalité," by Boris Souvarine in *Est & Ouest* No. 240 of July 1-15, 1960, as well as the special issue of *Est & Ouest* devoted to China in March, 1960, Nos. 232-233.

19. Most vivid in this respect are the romantic meanderings of Alexander Metaxas in *The Nation* of July 20, 1960. His article is a hodgepodge of "Soviet marshals," symbolizing "eternal Russia" and opposed to the "adventurous" policies of Peking; Kremlin "battles" between the "partisans of a Western rapprochement and those of the alliance with China at any price"; Khrushchev's "urgent" need for understanding with the West; "marked" Sino-Soviet economic rivalry, and . . . a "possibility" ("it is quite possible," says Mr. Metaxas) that "after November, a sort of rivalry may arise between Moscow and Peking, each seeking the favors of the next United States government. . . ."

20. The necessity for American-Russian alliance against China was stressed particularly in a *Saturday Evening Post* (March 19, 1960) article, a masterpiece in the compilation of hearsay to prove the existence of Sino-Soviet differences. The article is a major contribution to the world of unfounded conclusions. "Possibilities," "rumors," "hints," and "hypotheses" serve as background. The credulity of the author may be judged from his citations. He takes at face value statements by "Russians" ranging from a "Soviet general in civilian dress" to a "close associate" of Khrushchev, all of whom seem impelled by an irrepressible desire to confide in an American.

All the News . . .

"There are presumably large numbers in the Soviet elite who know that the headquarters of contemporary 'left sectarianism' is in Peiping . . ." *New York Times* editorial, June 14, 1960

"There has been speculation since the abortive summit conference . . . that Mr. Khrushchev's power and policies were being threatened by Stalinist elements inside the Kremlin—backed according to reports by the powerful communist party of China . . ." *New York Times* editorial, June 26, 1960

"Last week Mr. Khrushchev . . . ridiculed the views repeatedly advanced by the Chinese . . ." [Khrushchev did not. N.G.] *New York Times* editorial, June 28, 1960

conjectural terminology, which passes unnoticed by the reader and turns a speculation into an accepted fact. The second type of misinformation is a direct distortion of truth. The examples cited in boxes include both types.

Kremlinology Unchecked

One could go on for ever. Prominent political figures, impressed by the misinformation received, become victims of the wishful thinking of public opinion, and are led to support most questionable theses.

Day after day, false material, at times incredibly naive,¹⁷ poisons public opinion in the United States. Day after day, the unsophisticated reader is told that "the struggle . . . between Red Chinese chief Mao Tsetung and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev has reached unforeseen proportions." (*Washington Post*, Aug. 17, 1960.) American periodicals are seconded by the European press. Serious publications (the *Economist*, the *London Observer*) seriously discuss the ideological quarrels between Mao and Khrushchev.

Nothing is done in the United States to counteract this deluge of misinformation. (The true nature of the inspiration campaign has been exposed, however, in Europe, by the Paris magazine *Est & Ouest*, a publication of small circulation but tremendous value.¹⁸ The significance of the campaign becomes clear when the stories on the Sino-Soviet conflict

are linked with the misinformation current on internal Soviet affairs ("Kremlinology").

Experts on the Kremlin dream up influences of military cliques, conflicts between Khrushchev and Suslov, and the regular "disgrace" of Mikoyan¹⁹. The effect is to conjure up in the mind of the Western reader a Khrushchev with a new personality, an attractive peaceful individual supporting democratic views. The natural conclusion is that the West should meet him half-way to prevent his replacement by "Stalinists" and warmongering marshals. (Depending on the point the author wants to make, the "marshals" turn either "tough" or "soft.")

Such a line of thought is intensified by the misinformation on Peking. Khrushchev stands out as the kind, friendly "centrist" against the fierce "leftwinger" Mao, intent on starting another war. It is imperative, says inspiration, for the United States to seek understanding with the Soviet Union,²⁰ represented by "peaceful" Nikita, even, perhaps, at the price of a few concessions. . . .

The flood of communist-inspired misinformation on Sino-Soviet relations is reminiscent of that almost forgotten era dominated by the Institute of Pacific Relations. The present situation presents, however, many more dangers. In the good old IPR days, the problem was only China and American authority in Asia. Today it is the world.

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